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Five Pillars for Europe in the Second Trump Era

The second Trump administration has shifted the cornerstones of the liberal international order. How the EU responds will determine not only its global standing but also the very integrity of the European project.

Published on October 15, 2025

Note from the Editor: As part of a project between Carnegie Europe and the Brussels School of Governance, five students have written policy recommendations for EU officials in a world redefined by U.S. President Donald Trump’s second administration. The next generation is acutely aware that the world order their parents took for granted is no more, asking what a distinctly European model could be. They raise questions of autonomy, sovereignty, and the meaning of alliances, all while recognizing the race against time to scale up strategic means to match the pace of change. They also tackle more domestic—yet equally strategic—issues like democratic legitimacy and citizen buy-in for key policies like the Green Deal. To meet the moment, they argue, Europe must be proactive, maintain its integrity, and demonstrate leadership.

Trade and Economy

Nicolai Stuyvenberg

The second Trump administration has reignited the America First trade doctrine, marked by renewed tariffs on EU exports and threats to withdraw from the WTO. This protectionist stance challenges multilateral institutions, destabilizes global trade norms, and exposes Europe’s economic vulnerabilities, requiring Brussels to seek ways to insulate itself without provoking escalation.

Through a bottom-up approach, the EU should address internal weaknesses by strengthening cohesion and forming stronger trade mechanisms based on social justice, environmental sustainability, and economic inclusivity. Instruments like the Anti-Coercion Instrument must be properly enforced and complemented by advancements of both the savings and investment union and the Banking Union. These could strengthen the internal market against external shocks, as well as reduce reliance on U.S. capital. In doing so, barriers and constraints to the internal market could be tackled. Adopting an internal sandbox model would provide a flexible, controlled policy space where firms can temporarily test and innovate under regulatory flexibility, for example, between twelve and twenty-four months. This could ease market bottlenecks, facilitating the integration of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) into the market. Special emphasis should be placed on sectors where fragmentation is highest, notably green energy and digital technologies.

Externally, the EU should diversify trade partnerships to insulate key industries from U.S. shocks. It should focus on deepening cooperation with its neighbors, especially the UK and Norway, where tailored engagement can strengthen regional resilience and secure critical sectors like energy, while respecting political sensitivities (for example, Brexit). Beyond Europe, Brussels should prioritize diversification, including through trade agreements with Argentina and Mercosur for automotive and lithium supply chains, and with the Gulf Cooperation Council, particularly the United Arab Emirates, for agricultural exports and energy. These could be achieved by temporarily suspending values-based clauses and utilizing existing frameworks like the Global Gateway for swift, strategic expansion. To ease domestic resistance, the EU should establish mechanisms facilitating structured civil society engagement, ensuring that stakeholders, such as farmers and SMEs, can voice concerns and feed into negotiations.

Security and Defense

Stanislas Yahi

The White House’s transactional posture on defense, notably concerning Ukraine, presents Europe with the opportunity to take the initiative for its own security objectives. To do so, the EU needs innovative structures mobilizing all of its member states, alongside platforms for cross-sectoral talents to act in synergy.

The dichotomy between Europe's important material capabilities and its cognitive unreadiness for defensive warfare is a limitation that ought to be addressed, particularly within the shifting international context. Moreover, the lack of cohesion between European member states hinders the union’s strategic capacities. Hence, two key innovations can reintroduce strategic cognitive readiness and values of cohesion and collaboration between political and military parties.

First, to counter Europe’s current fragmentation across military strategy and collective preparedness, a strategic defense compact should be created. This structure ought to consolidate the union’s military, industrial, and strategic ambitions under a shared vision of autonomy. The objective is to address the necessity for the alignment of member states on capability goals across land, air, sea, and space. This entity could also connect with strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific in order to diversify the military allies of Europe.

Second, there is a necessity for cognitive readiness and cross-sectoral cooperation for defense. Hence, a military-civilian European defense executive should be created. This institution would translate political and military objectives into a cohesive and collaborative operational capacity. In doing so, it would bring the various EU bodies under one structure that would facilitate European strategic autonomy and cohesion while diminishing reliance on increasingly volatile outside partners.

Energy and Climate

Tanaz Farmani

In his second term, Trump has reversed U.S. climate policies, increased fossil fuel production, reduced global climate aid, and used energy exports to pressure allies. These changes weaken international climate cooperation and create new vulnerabilities for the EU. Brussels must now respond strategically.

The union should adopt a dual-track strategy to strengthen its climate leadership. In the short term, it must prioritize internal unity and public support. Member states, particularly in Eastern Europe, remain vulnerable due to dependence on U.S. liquid natural gas and slow progress on renewables. The EU should channel more funding into solar, wind, and cross-border infrastructure in these areas. Enhancing energy links and harmonizing regulations will fortify the union and boost independence. To avoid populist backlash, it should collaborate with local communities and civil society to develop policies, especially in regions dependent on fossil fuels.

At the same time, the EU should advance technological innovation to accelerate the green transition. Investing in smart grids, green hydrogen, energy storage, and digital infrastructure can reduce fossil fuel dependence and foster economic opportunity. While some regions may pursue green growth through clean-tech industries, others may benefit from alternative models that prioritize resilience, well-being, and sustainability. Recognizing this diversity will allow the EU to tailor climate strategies more effectively. In the long run, the EU should pursue a strategic global agenda. As the United States retreats from climate diplomacy and aid, the EU must step in by strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries such as Canada and Japan. These partnerships should evolve into broader coalitions that promote standards, regulatory alignment, and clean energy cooperation. The Global Gateway should focus on the Middle East and North Africa region to counterbalance China and the Gulf states and to secure sustainable energy connections.

Human Rights

Malte Wolski

The return of Donald Trump, along with the banalization of populism, led to the retrenchment of aid, increased transatlantic tensions, and the erosion of multilateral democratic norms. As a consequence, not only has Europe lost a powerful, values-driven ally, but it has also lost crucial support for Ukraine and democratic causes throughout the continent and beyond.

To create an adequate response, the European institutions must prepare a dual-track response focusing on their internal and external autonomy. To shield itself from the physical danger towards democracy on the European continent by Russia and the implications of the eroding human rights in the United States, the EU must continue to focus on its strategic autonomy. To achieve that, strategic independence has to be defined as a core doctrine across fields such as digital, defense, and economic policy—thus shaping and motivating future investments. To oversee this development, it would be beneficial to create a new working group of strategic autonomy.

Internally, the institutions must act swiftly and establish a robust mechanism to defend democracy, particularly the rule of law mechanism. To better monitor and react to infringements by member states, a clear breach catalogue is needed, along with an expansion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’ mandate for early warnings and transparent protection. Moreover, Article 7 has to be linked to the rule of law conditionality and thus used to freeze funds and protect core values, if there is a sufficient consensus.

Technology and Innovation

Andrei Joroveanu

The beginning of the second Trump administration has put more pressure than ever on the EU to develop strategic autonomy in technology and innovation. During Trump’s first term, Section 232, which would normally be used to initiate national investigations into imports, was used as a pretext to negotiate better trade deals and eliminate the trade deficit. Trump has already declared that the EU is extorting American tech companies and if he sees the rise of European high-tech companies as a threat to the American trade surplus of services, it would not be unlikely for the administration to take action. Therefore, the union needs to improve its industrial capabilities, diversify international partnerships, and create long-term technology policies in order to achieve greater independence from the foreign chip imports from China and the United States.

As such, Brussels should reform current strategic procurement rules to incentivize public investments in European technology companies in high-tech sectors. This involves standardizing joint procurement giving EU-wide preference to European technology and industrial companies. This will help streamline a pivot away from U.S. and Chinese tech firms.

Additionally, to reduce dependency on foreign allies and actors such as the United States in digital sovereignty and infrastructure, the EU should expedite the deployment of the IRIS2 satellite internet constellation and integrate it with advanced security features such as quantum encryption. Strategic firms such as ASML Holding N.V., a leading Dutch multinational company in the semiconductor industry, should be safeguarded with protectionist import policies that will protect local sourcing, and foreign investment screening should be increased to ensure European control of these companies.

The EU must establish formal regulations concerning the engagement of technology firms during crises, which should include guarantees for service continuity, protocols for rapid coordination, and transparent decision-making processes. Moreover, it should implement a voluntary private-assistance framework that companies may elect to support member states in response to cyber or hybrid threats. Finally, democratic oversight must be integrated into these measures through explicit transparency obligations and strict restrictions on the use of surveillance, satellite, and artificial intelligence tools to prevent misuse.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.