Modernizing its nuclear triad—the ability to launch nuclear missiles from land, sky and sea—is a key priority for the Kremlin. The long-held objective is to replace Soviet-era delivery systems with new, Russian designs. Yet these plans are behind schedule, and only a fraction of the targets for 2023 were met. Serious production and management problems are to blame—and they are unlikely to be overcome any time soon.

At first glance, it might seem as if Russia’s nuclear modernization drive has been successful. Notably, last year, the proportion of modern (i.e. non-Soviet) arms in the arsenal of the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) increased from 85% to 88%.

For example, the Yars missile transporter erector launcher (TEL) is replacing the Soviet-era Topol. RVSN’s Kozelsky Missile Division is being re-equipped with silo-based Yars inter-continental ballistic missiles, and the Bologovsky Missile Division has already completed this process. The Orenburg Missile Division recently re-equipped with brand new Avangard missile systems (the third such regiment to do this in recent years).

Less progress, however, has been made with the Sarmat missile system, which is supposed to replace the Soviet-era Voevoda. President Vladimir Putin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and Yuri Borisov, the head of state-owned space corporation Roscosmos, all promised the Sarmat system would be deployed by the end of 2023. But not one Sarmat has yet been loaded into a silo, a step originally scheduled for 2021.

So important is RVSN re-armament that the Kremlin is even skimping on testing. There was only one test launch of Sarmat instead of planned six in 2022. The imperative is to show Russia has upgraded its arsenal—whether these new systems actually work is of secondary concern.

There is a similar amount of uncertainty surrounding air-launched systems. While it’s true that Russia has had some success in producing air-launched missiles (according to Putin, modern arms, such as the Kh-101/102 and Kh-555 missiles, account for 97% of this arsenal), there have also been delays. It was expected that, in 2023, Russia would finish developing the medium-range Kh-SD (Kh-50) missile. However, this did not come to pass, and so Russia continues to rely on some Soviet-era missiles even in wartime.

The most troubled aspect of Russia’s nuclear modernization is air delivery systems, with industry still incapable of producing new bombers. Even the modernization of existing aircraft faces production and management problems.

Russia is currently attempting to upgrade the Soviet-era Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers with more powerful engines, replacing their avionics, and expanding their compatibility with a greater number of weapons.

Responsibility for upgrading Tu-160s lies with the Kazan Aviation Plant (KAZ), which has so far—more or less—concluded work on four bombers. As of 2023, the Defense Ministry was still testing one bomber jointly with Tupolev, while KAZ continues to test the other three. KAZ is also building new Tu-160Ms (under a 2018 contract, Tupolev must supply the Defense Ministry with 10 of these by 2027).

Shoigu said in early 2023 that Russia’s Aerospace Forces would receive three Tu-160M bombers that year. In September, he increased this figure to four aircraft. However, in reality, the Defense Ministry did not receive any Tu-160Ms in 2023. Despite this, it apparently expects to receive a further two aircraft in 2024, a demand that cannot be met unless testing requirements are slimmed down.

These delays are easily explained. KAZ’s own modernization (supposed to be concluded by 2020) has been disrupted by Western sanctions, and difficulties with import substitution. It has faced issues accessing modern machinery, high-quality composite materials, high-strength steel, and electronic components. The government demands to expand the production of civil Tu-214 planes from one to twenty a year is another toll on KAZ’s strained resources.

All this slows the pace at which orders are completed, and generates tension between industry and the government. In 2022, the Trade and Industry Ministry unsuccessfully sued Tupolev for 5.8 billion rubles ($65 million) over the Tu-160M contract.

Similarly behind schedule is Russia’s development of an advanced, long-range bomber. The first prototype of a next-generation strategic stealth bomber—another KAZ project—was due in 2021–2022, but has failed to materialize. The Trade and Industry Ministry is also suing over these delays—this time for 4.98 billion rubles.

The picture is similarly patchy when it comes to the naval part of Russia’s nuclear triad. In 2023, the Defense Ministry received delivery of the Emperor Alexander III, a Borei-class nuclear submarine armed with Bulava ballistic missiles. Yet, the Sevmash shipyard failed to deliver a further two Borei-class submarines, or float out the Knyaz Pozharsky submarine. As a result, Sevmash will have to either rush work, or limit testing in order to meet its upcoming deadlines.

All the while, the introduction of a series of highly publicized new sea-based weapons has seriously stalled. Although Russia maintains that these arms are being tested, evidence to this effect remains extremely sparse.

Take the nuclear-capable Poseidon super torpedo. In January 2023, state media reported that Poseidons were ready to be deployed aboard a submarine. However, it later emerged that the torpedoes’ reactors had only just undergone bench testing, meaning it will take years for them to actually be deployed.

Khabarovsk, a submarine due to be armed with Poseidons, has not even been floated out (even though this was originally planned for 2020). Another submarine capable of carrying Poseidons, Belgorod, is at least being trialed by the Northern Fleet. Still, its deployment with Poseidons was scheduled for 2023. More generally, there is no basing infrastructure in the Pacific Ocean for either submarine.

Beyond the Poseidon, there is the nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile. Although Putin boasted in October 2023 of successful tests, he likely meant the missile’s engine rather than the missile itself, which has yet to be flown.

All in all, it might appear that Russia is making major strides forward when it comes to rejuvenating its nuclear weapons systems, with modern arms now accounting for 95% of the country’s nuclear arsenal (up from 91% a year ago). Yet, other areas of the nuclear triad—for example ships and bombers—lag much further behind.

At first, the plan was for RVSN to fully transition to modern missile systems in 2021. Then, this was pushed back to 2024. Another postponement seems almost certain, with at least four more years required to fully retire the Soviet-era Topol and Voevoda systems. That means the new nuclear weapons hyped by the Kremlin will see out yet another year as nothing more than projects-in-development.