The Middle East is experiencing a level of conflict unseen for decades. The spiral of escalation that began with the terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, has now lasted almost a year and looks increasingly less like an aberration and more like a new stage in the region’s history.
For many years, Russia has striven to keep its distance from events in the Middle East, maintaining channels of communication with all parties. But the new, post-October 7 reality has made this an ever more difficult tightrope to walk. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine led Moscow to seek warmer relations with Iran, which has caused serious concern in the United States and Israel. That concern has been aggravated by the confrontation between the United States and Russia, which pushes Moscow further into Tehran’s arms. Even if Russia would like to continue to perform a balancing act in the Middle East, regional powers increasingly believe it has taken a side—and they will act accordingly.
Moscow’s deepening ties with Tehran have been obvious since the start of the war in Ukraine. In official statements, Russia often now takes Iran’s side against Israel, while in Syria, the two sides team up to pressure the United States, with Russian jets maneuvering dangerously close to U.S. aircraft while pro-Iranian groups attack U.S. assets on the ground.
Nevertheless, Russia has not been in a hurry to ditch its previous role as a mediator. Even though there is no longer any dialogue between Moscow and Washington, Moscow continues to try to talk to other powers—even Israel. That is entirely rational: after all, a full-on spat could lead to Israel retaliating, perhaps by sending arms to Ukraine. As time passes, however, Russia will find it harder to claim neutrality while deepening its cooperation with Iran.
Even though Russia and Iran are not planning to enter into a full military alliance, Moscow has successfully used Iranian equipment and technology in Ukraine. Russian generals have suddenly gone from being the instructors of their Iranian counterparts to their students. As a result, Moscow has been looking at selling modern military equipment to Tehran, and events in the Middle East mean Iran is more and more interested in what Russia has to offer.
Iran’s most pressing problem is the woeful state of its air force and underdeveloped air defenses. Its adversary Israel has the most powerful air force in the region. In conflicts, Israel strives to control the skies and use its air force as its primary strike capability. That is in addition, of course, to the might of the U.S. military, which guarantees Israel’s security.
Judging by official statements, Moscow has agreed to supply Tehran with military helicopters and fighter jets: Su-35 fighters, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Yak-130 jet trainers. Some of the latter have already been delivered, and Iranian pilots are using them for training purposes. Su-35s could be delivered as early as this year.
There is less clarity over the attack helicopters. Russia is in desperate need of these aircraft, and it’s possible that there will be no capacity for export in the coming years.
There is also some evidence that Russia has begun to sell modern radars to Iran. Although the Iranians would like to acquire full air defense systems, it’s not that simple. Russian air defenses are heavily engaged with fending off Ukrainian missiles and drones, and it’s unlikely Moscow will have any spares to send to Tehran in the immediate future.
The most important point is that Russia has already begun to supply Iran with new military equipment. For the moment, the size of the deliveries is limited by the situation in Ukraine. But if the intensity of the fighting in Ukraine wanes, or if there is a ceasefire, Moscow will be free to export new aircraft and missiles to Tehran. From the point of view of the United States and Israel, such a scenario is at the very least possible—and that means they will prepare.
Recent leaks confirm the Kremlin is seriously considering supplying weapons not only to Iran, but also to pro-Iran groups that would likely use them to target U.S. forces. The Kremlin’s logic is that since U.S. military equipment is being used against the Russian armed forces in Ukraine, Russia has the right to supply arms to anyone fighting against Washington.
This will not necessarily change the situation on the ground. Hamas, for example, has repeatedly used Russian-made weapons, and that has not resulted in a collapse in Russia-Israel relations.
Strong opposition from Saudi Arabia has obliged Russia to refrain from supplying weapons to the Houthis in Yemen. But there is likely to be far less protest over deliveries to Shiite militias in Iraq, Lebanese forces, or armed groups in Syria.
As a consequence of all of this, Russia is being drawn deeper and deeper into the conflicts of the Middle East. Some maintain that this will have little effect on the balance of power, and it’s true that the military significance of potential arms supplies to Iran is negligible. The most problematic would be the delivery of Su-35s, but even that would be a maximum of twenty-four planes. In comparison, Israel has about fifty fifth-generation F-35 fighters alone, as well as hundreds of other aircraft that are more advanced than anything Iran owns.
Nevertheless, Russian arms supplies would be an important signal—particularly for the United States and Israel. They don’t so much change the balance of power as suggest that the balance of power could change in the future. After all, perhaps more arms deliveries will follow. And if Russia gives Iran air defense systems, will that make it harder to destroy targets in Iran?
A steady flow of Russian weapons to Iran means the United States and Israel would find themselves facing a classic security dilemma. The logic would run as follows: If Iran is getting stronger and a major clash is inevitable, surely it’s better for it to happen sooner rather than later? Israel likes to set the agenda, and must already be thinking about such a scenario. While the United States is traditionally more cautious, Washington could also assess Iran’s growing power as an unacceptable risk.
Even small increases in Russian support for Iran and its allies make Moscow a participant in events in the Middle East, at least in the eyes of the United States and Israel. Strong backing from the Kremlin for Tehran could be seen as a serious enough threat to prompt swift and decisive action.
