The concrete goal of an end to the hostilities in Ukraine has been replaced by a host of vague Russian demands concerning a range of issues and regions.
Alexander Baunov
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"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
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}REQUIRED IMAGE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: June 20, 2007
- NEWS RELEASE -
WASHINGTON, June 20--While the historic May 29 talks between the United States and Iran in Baghdad hinted at the possibility of renewed dialogue, the search for an effective foreign policy toward Iran has proven elusive for both U.S. and European administrations. The need for engagement with Iran is often cited as a major step in easing Middle East tensions and a matter of necessity to contend with Iran’s nuclear ambitions—yet remains a very difficult approach to implement.
In a new Carnegie Policy Outlook, Guidelines for Approaching Iran, Carnegie Endowment Associate Karim Sadjadpour points to current realities in Iran and existing difficulties that should guide any attempts to engage Iran and influence its policies.
Key conclusions:
Notes:
###
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
The concrete goal of an end to the hostilities in Ukraine has been replaced by a host of vague Russian demands concerning a range of issues and regions.
Alexander Baunov
It’s a testing time for Russia’s policy in Serbia and the wider region, but it would be premature to conclude from one political setback that the days of Russian influence are over.
Dimitar Bechev
A gas deal would create palpable economic value, but it wouldn’t fundamentally change the position of either Russia or the EU.
Sergey Vakulenko
Nobody in the Kremlin fancies a fight with the whole European continent. Instead, the Russian leadership would be likely to opt for a short, targeted strike.
Maksim Samorukov
The war does threaten Putin’s existence. That is why he does not negotiate.
René Nyberg