Commentary
With the blocking of Starlink terminals and restriction of access to Telegram, Russian troops in Ukraine have suffered a double technological blow. But neither service is irreplaceable.
Maria Kolomychenko
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Source: Getty
In The Media
Obama's Plan for Iraq
No matter how long U.S. troops stay in Iraq, a stable power-sharing agreement will emerge only after all factions have tested each other’s strength and exhausted their desire to fight. Leaving Iraq is the right thing to do, for the U.S. and for Iraq.
Published on Mar 1, 2009
Source: Washington Post
The U.S. presence interrupted a struggle for political power that always follows removal of a government and eventually forced it into nonviolent channels. But the struggle is far from over. Recent political accommodations are extremely fragile, and it is likely that many angry groups have chosen to lie low until the Americans are gone.
Stable agreements to share power emerge only after the parties have tested each other's strength and will and their desire to fight has burned out. History shows that this takes many years, especially when all sides are heavily armed.
So the United States may face a departure in 2011 in the face of great instability. President Obama understands that could happen even if our troops were to stay five more years. There is no substitute for Iraqis sorting out their own political future. But after so much sacrifice and bloodshed, it may not feel much like a victory.
This article first appeared in the Washington Post.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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