The Decline of U.S. Hegemony: Regaining International Consent
Through various policies of the Bush administration, the United States lost a considerable amount of international authority. Amidst a system of rising powers, this could have grave consequences for global stability. However, the future depends on the Obama administration’s efforts to regain American authority.
Link Copied
By Kevin Slaten
Published on Mar 15, 2009
Source: The Journal of Politics & International Affairs
The Decline of U.S. Hegemony: Regaining InternatioAfter September 11, the Bush administration chose to confront contemporary threats to national and global security—terrorism, rogue regimes, drug trafficking, and WMDs—with a Bush Doctrine that left little room for negotiation. Moreover, in March of 2003, the U.S., without United Nations approval, invaded and proceeded to occupy Iraq. In June of 2006, America’s closest ally, Great Britain, had a public that only held a 56% favorable opinion of the U.S. while other western states held far lower opinions – 39, 27, 23, and 43% for France, Germany, Spain, and Russia, respectively. Through its actions and attitudes, the United States has lost a large amount international consent.
This essay argues that during the Clinton administration, the U.S. possessed a significant amount of authority over most NATO countries – enough authority that America lead hegemony among those states – and those states consented to American actions in international relations. Additionally, the study shows that this authority declined significantly due to policy changes during the Bush administration.
In hegemony, the hegemon – the United States – and its subordinates are endowed with certain role expectations; expectations that are held by subordinates that consent to the hegemon’s authority and, likewise, expectations that are projected by the hegemon onto subordinates. The more that subordinate states conform to role expectations, the stronger the hegemony. Two methodologies are used to measure the role conformity among various states during the 1990’s and 2000’s. The first method uses United Nations General Assembly voting data to compare the voting record of the U.S. against other states and groups of states. Voting similarly to the United States is a subordinate role expectation, so the more a state votes with America, the more that state is conforming to the subordinate role expectation. The second method looks at cross-national attitude surveys, which reflect various public’s consent for and perception of American authority; strong consent for and positive perception of American authority is expected in the case of hegemony. As mentioned, attitudes have recently taken a large unfavorable downturn for the United States among NATO nations.
After examining the results of both of these measures, some possible outcomes of a system of declining hegemony are discussed from differing theoretical perspectives. The essay concludes with a normative argument pertaining to what the United States’ policy ought to be amidst a system of declining hegemony. Ultimately, the interests of America as well as the global community are best served by a policy that seeks to regain international consent.
The author's views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Carnegie Endowment.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Andrey Melnichenko’s essay offers no answer to the fundamental question of how, under any kind of negotiated settlement, Europe can protect itself from the Russian ressentiment that is inevitable in all scenarios except for an outright victory for Putin.
Despite unhappiness on the ground, Moscow is determined to use both carrot and stick to ensure there is record support for United Russia in occupied Ukraine.
The recent damage inflicted by Ukrainian drones and missiles on Russia has made Belarus aware of its own vulnerabilities—and surprisingly amenable to Kyiv’s demands.
It is not a phenomenon unique to Russia that the public of a country at war (even the aggressor) enduring airstrikes will not overturn its government but rather show solidarity with it and blame its woes on the enemy.
Russia looks set to reap economic benefits from closer ties with Southeast Asian countries that are keen to find reliable energy suppliers and diversify trade ties.