• Research
  • Politika
  • About
Carnegie Russia Eurasia center logoCarnegie lettermark logo
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Henri J. Barkey"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "menaTransitions",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "MEP",
  "programs": [
    "Middle East"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Middle East",
    "Türkiye",
    "Iraq",
    "Gulf",
    "Levant"
  ],
  "topics": []
}

Source: Getty

In The Media

Turkey and Its Relations with Iraq

If Turkey manages to continue with improved relations with Iraq, Iraqi Kurds, and its own domestic Kurdish population, then it will have overcome the one of the most important obstacles to its stability.

Link Copied
By Henri J. Barkey
Published on May 27, 2010

Source: USIP's On the Issues

Turkey and Its Relations with IraqIn the Special Report, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq,” author Henri Barkey, professor of international relations at Lehigh University, examines the change in relations and what led to the improvements, and argues why sustained attention is needed to prevent events from undermining the progress achieved to date. This essay is drawn from a forthcoming work on Iraq’s regional relations, co-edited by Barkey, USIP’s Scott Lasensky and Phebe Marr.

In this On the Issues, Barkey discusses reasons for the improved relations, and its significance for Iraq’s future and U.S. national security interests.

USIP: In your Special Report, Turkey's “New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing Iraqi Kurdistan,” you argue that relations between Turkey, Iraq and Kurdistan's Regional Government (KRG) have improved dramatically. How did this transformation come about?    

Barkey: Turkey came to the realization that the KRG is here to stay and that, in fact, it is far more amenable to relations -- diplomatic and commercial -- with Turkey than anywhere else in the region.  Improved relations with the KRG enables Ankara to have more say in what happens in Iraq and also helps reduce domestic tensions with its own Kurdish minority.  The Turkish military also has come to understand that it will not vanquish the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey through violent means alone and a new approach was needed.

USIP: What does this suggest about Turkey's own political stability and direction?  

Barkey: If Turkey manages to continue with improved relations with Iraq, Iraqi Kurds and its own domestic Kurdish population, then it will have overcome the single most important obstacle to its stability since the inception of the republic in 1923.  This said this is a tall order. And failure to resolve the domestic Kurdish problem remains Turkey's Achilles' Heel.

USIP: What does a more cooperative Turkish-Iraqi relationship mean for U.S. interests---specifically, will it affect plans to draw down American military forces?

Barkey: Turkey has transformed itself from a problem country to a helpful and critically important one in Iraq as far as Washington is concerned. It would have been far more difficult for the U.S. to start executing its withdrawal if Turkish-KRG relations remained hostile.

USIP: You’ve helped to lead the Institute’s efforts to promote dialogue between Turkish and Iraqi foreign policy figures—and between Iraqis and their neighbors more broadly--what kind of lessons can you draw from those efforts on the ground?

Barkey: It is very difficult and one needs a great deal of patience.  Most importantly one should expect that change may take place when you least expect it and independent of your efforts.  Still, one always wants to hope that one's efforts contributed even if it is in a minor way to a positive outcome.

USIP: What might undermine this new entente between Turkey and Iraq?  

Barkey: The domestic Kurdish situation in Turkey.  If the Kurdish opening in Turkey falters and if the frustrations of the populations--Kurdish and Turkish--continue to build up with no end in sight, Turkish attitudes towards northern Iraq is likely to harden.  In turn, Baghdad will have to make its choice in the event of Turkish-KRG tensions, and it is unlikely that it will side with Ankara against Erbil.

USIP: How could the U.S. - and Iraq and its neighbors - prevent deterioration, and help maintain improved relations in this region?

Barkey: The U.S. has to do four things.  First, open a consulate in Erbil. Psychologically, it matters to the Kurds to know that Washington officially acknowledges them and is here to stay in the North - even if symbolically - for a long time to come.  It signals others that the U.S. takes the KRG seriously. Second, once the Iraqi government is formed, offer assistance to UNAMI and all parties involved to help resolve the issue of the disputed territories peacefully.  Third, help the new Iraqi government finalize the hydrocarbon law. Finally, begin offering assistance to the KRG on good governance; it has been alone for far too long managing on its own. 

About the Author

Henri J. Barkey

Former Visiting Scholar, Middle East Program

Barkey served as a member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff, working primarily on issues related to the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and intelligence from 1998 to 2000.

    Recent Work

  • Article
    Winners and Losers in Turkey’s Election

      Henri J. Barkey

  • Article
    The Road to Turkey’s June Elections: Crises, Strategies, and Outcomes

      Henri J. Barkey

Henri J. Barkey
Former Visiting Scholar, Middle East Program
Henri J. Barkey
Middle EastTürkiyeIraqGulfLevant

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Once Neutral on the Ukraine War, Arab States Increasingly Favor Moscow

    Disillusioned with the West over Gaza, Arab countries are not only trading more with Russia; they are also more willing to criticize Kyiv.  

      Ruslan Suleymanov

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Baku Proceeds With Caution as Ethnic Azeris Join Protests in Neighboring Iran

    Baku may allow radical nationalists to publicly discuss “reunification” with Azeri Iranians, but the president and key officials prefer not to comment publicly on the protests in Iran.

      Bashir Kitachaev

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    What Russia Will—and Won’t—Do for Its Embattled Ally Iran

    It’s one thing to export Russian helicopters to Iran to fight the insurgency, and it’s easy to imagine Moscow becoming a haven for fleeing Iranian leaders. But it’s very difficult to imagine Russian troops defending the Iranian regime on the ground.

      Nikita Smagin

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Russia-Türkiye Ties Falter Amid Stresses of Ukraine War

    Mutual suspicion between Moscow and Ankara is growing as Türkiye cozies up to Washington and NATO while reducing its dependence on Russian energy.  

      Ruslan Suleymanov

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Armenia’s Election Is a Foreign Affair

    As the 2026 Armenian election approaches, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is facing fierce opposition from both Russia and the diaspora. He will need the help of Europe, the United States, and regional neighbours to advance his ambitious foreign policy. 

      Thomas de Waal

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Carnegie Russia Eurasia logo, white
  • Research
  • Politika
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Privacy
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.