Q&A
Eugene Rumer
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Source: Getty
Commentary
Is Russia Pursuing Its Own Ink Spot Strategy in Eastern Ukraine?
A counter-insurgency strategy from Iraq and Afghanistan may be proving effective as a tool of Russian or pro-Russian insurgency in Eastern Ukraine.
By Eugene Rumer
Published on Apr 18, 2014
Now largely forgotten, or relegated to the category of near-ancient history, the ink-spot strategy was all the rage at the time when the United States was fighting the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Embraced by U.S. counterinsurgency gurus as the answer to the problem of controlling vast stretches of both countries riven by civil war or terrorist activity, the strategy calls for establishing a series of strongholds where normal day-to-day life and government activity are restored. These strongholds, secured by military and police personnel, establish security zones around them. Insurgents are gradually pushed out from these zones or eliminated, and like ink spots on paper, the safety zones spread and expand the security perimeter outward, until the blots merge into one large area.
Is Russia pursuing a version of the ink spot strategy in reverse in Eastern Ukraine? Pro-Russian insurgents and ostensibly unidentified, but probably Russian and pro-Russian, military and security personnel have been seizing police stations and government buildings in cities in Eastern Ukraine—in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Luhansk, etc.—spreading across the map like ink blots. They are long ways away from merging into a large area, but this strategy is proving quite effective at challenging the power and authority of the Kyiv government, undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and spreading the insurgency over a vast region that otherwise the Russian military would struggle to occupy and control. It is a strategy of denial, and it is achieving results that are the opposite of what the original ink spot strategy was intended to do—clearing out the insurgency and establishing control over a large area. A counter-insurgency strategy from Iraq and Afghanistan is proving effective as a tool of insurgency in Eastern Ukraine.
How far will the insurgents—Russian or pro-Russian—take this strategy? It depends on the larger goals behind it, which remain a mystery. Will the insurgents and their presumed Russian masters be content to simply destabilize Eastern and Southern Ukraine and keep the region permanently unstable as a pressure point and a bargaining chip with the Kyiv government? The ink spot strategy appears well suited for this purpose. It also appears quite effective as an alternative to a full-fledged military invasion of Ukraine, which would run the risk of escalating into a protracted and costly military conflict, in which the insurgency vs. counterinsurgency roles would be reversed, and the Russian military would face the daunting task of stabilizing a vast area of Ukraine. Last, but not least, the spreading ink spots will disrupt the conduct of the May 25 election, thus making it possible for Russia to challenge the legitimacy of Ukraine’s future leadership.
As useful as the ink spot strategy is at the current phase, it cannot be played out indefinitely. The more it spreads, the wider the area consumed by the insurgency, the greater the challenge for the insurgent force to establish its own government and build its credibility as the alternative to the old regime. That’s the point where the erstwhile insurgents will discover that a strategy of denial is a lot easier to implement than recover from it.
About the Author
Eugene Rumer
Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program
Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program.
- Russia Will Be More Dangerous After the War with Ukraine
- Belligerent and Beleaguered: Russia After the War with UkrainePaper
Eugene Rumer
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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