• Research
  • Politika
  • About
Carnegie Russia Eurasia center logoCarnegie lettermark logo
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Dmitri Trenin"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "East Asia",
    "China",
    "Russia"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform",
    "Foreign Policy",
    "Civil Society"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Commentary
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Color Revolutions in Asia? Beijing and Moscow Are on the Same Side

The Chinese do not have to listen to the Russians to see threats to their national sovereignty and domestic stability on the horizon. Both see Western support for democracy as a tool to contain them internationally and to weaken them from within.

Link Copied
By Dmitri Trenin
Published on Jun 20, 2014

When the senior Russian participant at the recent Shangri-La dialogue, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov, devoted a major part of his remarks to the threat of color revolutions in the Asia-Pacific region, he received a lot of blank stares in return. A number of Asian delegates took Antonov's focus as evidence of how much Moscow is obsessed with Ukraine and how little it understands Asia. Earlier this month, Eurasia Outlook published a participant's takeaway from the conference which referred to precisely that reaction. However, one country in the region probably shares, at least in part, Antonov's assessment, and is prepared to act accordingly.

Last week, Beijing published a White Paper on Hong Kong, which admonished the residents of that special administrative region of the People's Republic of China that, in the famous formula, "one country, two systems," the first element was clearly the dominant one. The reason for Beijing's restatement of its sovereign rights  was the popular movement, "Occupy Central," which staged demonstrations and even scuffles at the city legislature, with the aim of promoting popular ballot for the Hong Kong's chief executive's election, now slated for 2017.

The central government in Beijing was not amused. It fears foreign encouragement for pro-democracy protestors. These fears were not calmed by the statements by the U.S. and UK consulates in Hong Kong, and the remarks by a former Canadian consul-general, in support of freedom of expression as a linchpin of the city's continued vitality and attractiveness. Moreover, Beijing let it be known it was developing a similar warning paper for Macau. To make things absolutely clear, retired Chinese officials made references to the PLA's duty of maintaining law and order in an emergency. Coming days after the 25th anniversary of Tiananmen, these references were chilling.

As the new Chinese leadership embarks on a serious economic and administrative reform agenda, it wants to minimize the risk of domestic instability. "People power" and direct elections in Hong Kong can project destabilizing influence onto the mainland. The spike in terrorist activity and continued ethnic tensions in Xinjiang is even more worrisome. There, as in Tibet, Beijing points to outside interference as one of the sources of the problem. In the capital itself, the Communist Party disciplinarians have recently warned the Chinese Academy of Social Science against becoming a tool of foreign influence.

In its neighborhood, China has been witnessing a Western effort to "give democracy a chance" in Myanmar, which, to Beijing at least, has a geopolitical and strategic element to it as well. For their own part, the Chinese are now reaching out to the Thai military, who have just carried out a coup to end a long period of domestic political infighting which paralyzed the country. A democratic uprising in North Korea—if one were to imagine such a thing—would have enormous negative consequences for China's national security.

The Chinese do not have to listen to the Russians, of course, to spot problems on the horizon. The fact is that China's and Russia's views on their own national sovereignty and on the threats to domestic stability coincide to a significant degree. Both see Western support for democracy as a tool to contain them internationally and to weaken them from within. As Antonov was speaking, the PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff, his co-panelist, was not visibly nodding. But he hardly disagreed.

About the Author

Dmitri Trenin

Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space

      Dmitri Trenin

  • Commentary
    What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West Revealed

      Dmitri Trenin

Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Political ReformForeign PolicyCivil SocietyEast AsiaChinaRussia

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Could Migrants From India and Africa Solve Russia’s Labor Shortage?

    The demands of the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine, demographic problems, and public hostility toward Central Asians mean Russia does not have enough workers.  

      Salavat Abylkalikov

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Russian Market Sours for Belarusian State Companies

    Minsk’s faith in the future of its larger neighbor’s economy is fading as Belarusian firms in Russia see record losses.    

      Olga Loiko

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Did Putin Return From China Empty-Handed?

    With no key agreement signed on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, there is a risk that the window of opportunity for Russia will close if Chinese power generation becomes so green that new gas sources are no longer of any interest to Beijing.

      • Alexander Gabuev

      Alexander Gabuev

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    What Does Central Europe’s Post-Orban Russia Policy Look Like?

    Though Orban is gone, Putin can still count on some like-minded individuals in Central and Eastern Europe. However, they will seek to avoid open confrontation with EU institutions over Ukraine and their ties with Moscow.


      Dimitar Bechev

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Are Russia-Japan Relations Really Warming Up?

    The truth is that Japan’s government is seeking a degree of reengagement but at a vastly reduced level than under Abe. Most significantly, Japan has shown no willingness to ease sanctions.

      James D.J. Brown

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Carnegie Russia Eurasia logo, white
  • Research
  • Politika
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.