Alexey Malashenko
{
"authors": [
"Alexey Malashenko"
],
"type": "commentary",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Caucasus",
"Russia",
"Azerbaijan",
"Armenia"
],
"topics": [
"Security",
"Military",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}Source: Getty
Putin Brings Armenian and Azeri Leaders Together, But No Solution to Karabakh in Sight
The Sochi meeting between Russia’s, Armenia’s, and Azerbaijan’s presidents is but one episode in the series of Russia’s protracted peacemaking efforts. Rather, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict serves as a great pretext for Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus.
It is unlikely that the August 10 Sochi meeting between Russia’s, Armenia’s, and Azerbaijan’s presidents will become a turning point in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This is but one episode in the series of Russia’s protracted peacemaking efforts. Rather, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict serves as a great pretext for Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus. As long as the conflict continues, and no one knows how long it will last, Russia will maintain its presence in the region. If the conflict is somehow miraculously resolved, Moscow’s sway over both Azerbaijan and Armenia will diminish.
However, in Nagorno-Karabakh, we are dealing with a perennial conflict, which will remain fundamentally unchanged unless some global political upheavals are to occur.
So how is this trilateral summit different from other meetings of similar format?
Second, the success of Russia’s peacemaking efforts would be quite useful to Moscow at this time. The Ukrainian crisis devalues Russia’s peacemaking efforts; fewer and fewer people still believe it is willing and able to resolve conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Interestingly enough, the smiling Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan asked Putin to keep him informed of the steps Russia takes in Ukraine, promising to do the same vis-à-vis the events in the Caucasus region.
In other words, if Russia is able to succeed in its peacemaking efforts now, it might somewhat restore its dented international reputation.
Third, Russia is seeking to strengthen its position in the post-Soviet space more than ever before. In this context, it is interested in maintaining good working relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is especially true in light of the fact that Armenia is Russia’s strategic partner; it is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and also intends to join the Customs Union and possibly the Eurasian Union. For its part, Azerbaijan, which has always considered Russia one of its major international partners, will have to overcome the temptation to supply Europe with gas under the so-called Southern Gas Corridor initiative, thus taking Russia out of the energy equation. So it is getting increasingly more difficult for Russia to preserve balance in its relations with both countries.
Fourth, it is possible that Russia may take some unconventional steps to validate its status of a peacemaker. For instance, it may offer to send its peacekeepers into the region (such rumors had been circulating before the start of the summit). Such an event seems unlikely, but if it indeed takes place, it may create a precedent for more Russian peacekeeping engagements in some other regions, such as the southeast of Ukraine.
In any event, the August trilateral summit goes beyond the actual Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while the conflict itself remains unresolved.
About the Author
Former Scholar in Residence, Religion, Society, and Security Program
Malashenko is a former chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Religion, Society, and Security Program.
- What Will Uzbekistan’s New President Do?Commentary
- Preserving the Calm in Russia’s Muslim CommunityCommentary
Alexey Malashenko
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- The Kremlin Is Destroying Its Own System of Coerced VotingCommentary
The use of technology to mobilize Russians to vote—a system tied to the relative material well-being of the electorate, its high dependence on the state, and a far-reaching system of digital control—is breaking down.
Andrey Pertsev
- Can the Disparate Threads of Ukraine Peace Talks Be Woven Together?Commentary
Putin is stalling, waiting for a breakthrough on the front lines or a grand bargain in which Trump will give him something more than Ukraine in exchange for concessions on Ukraine. And if that doesn’t happen, the conflict could be expanded beyond Ukraine.
Alexander Baunov
- Once Neutral on the Ukraine War, Arab States Increasingly Favor MoscowCommentary
Disillusioned with the West over Gaza, Arab countries are not only trading more with Russia; they are also more willing to criticize Kyiv.
Ruslan Suleymanov
- How Will the Loss of Starlink and Telegram Impact Russia’s Military?Commentary
With the blocking of Starlink terminals and restriction of access to Telegram, Russian troops in Ukraine have suffered a double technological blow. But neither service is irreplaceable.
Maria Kolomychenko
- Signs of an Imminent End to the Ukraine War Are DeceptiveCommentary
The main source of Russian aggression is a profound mistrust of the West and the firm belief that it intends to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. As long as this fear persists, the war will not end.
Tatiana Stanovaya