The European far right might fail to steer EU policy in the direction Russia wants, but they will create enough chaos inside Europe to benefit the Kremlin.
Dimitar Bechev
The Alliance is being pulled toward a NATO 3.0 model by two structural drivers: the changing character of warfare, made visible by the war in Ukraine, and the redistribution of transatlantic burden-sharing as the United States gives greater priority to homeland security and the Indo-Pacific.
Senior Fellow, Europe Program
Alper Coşkun is a senior fellow in the Europe Program and leads the Türkiye and the World Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
Fatih Ceylan
Tacan İldem
Nihat Kökmen
Yavuz Türkgenci
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe
Sinan Ülgen is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, transatlantic relations, international trade, economic security, and digital policy.
Çiğdem Üstün
H.E. Ahmet Üzümcü
The European far right might fail to steer EU policy in the direction Russia wants, but they will create enough chaos inside Europe to benefit the Kremlin.
Dimitar Bechev
If the Russian-speaking community in Latvia cannot articulate their interests without being seen as disloyal, they could end up embracing a pro-Kremlin agenda.
Sergejs Potapkins
With the growth in points of friction between the great powers, organizations like the SCO will continue to play a role in the strategic adaptation of the smaller powers caught between them.
Temur Umarov
Two divergent trends—Putin’s hardline vision of how to prosecute the war in Ukraine, and a growing desire for change in Russia—could tear the regime apart.
Tatiana Stanovaya
Andrey Melnichenko’s essay offers no answer to the fundamental question of how, under any kind of negotiated settlement, Europe can protect itself from the Russian ressentiment that is inevitable in all scenarios except for an outright victory for Putin.
Leonid Bershidsky