Fiona Hill, Anatol Lieven, Thomas de Waal
{
"authors": [
"Anatol Lieven"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "russia",
"programs": [
"Russia and Eurasia"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Caucasus",
"Russia"
],
"topics": [
"Security"
]
}REQUIRED IMAGE
Chechnya: History as Nightmare
Source: Carnegie
By
Originally published in the New York Times, November 3, 2002
WASHINGTON - Direct responsibility for last month's terrorist attack in Moscow lies with the Chechen militants and Chechen-based international Muslim extremists who carried it out. But its roots are embedded in the history of Chechen-Russian conflict.
Chechen resistance to the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, beginning in the 19th century, was prolonged and bloody. Then, in 1944, Stalin deported almost the entire population, roughly 400,000 people, to Central Asia, where many died. This legacy helps explain why Chechen nationalism has been more radical and anti-Russian than that of Russia's other Muslim ethnic minorities.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Chechens, led by Gen. Dzhokhar Dudayev, deposed the old Soviet leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic and seized power in Grozny, the capital. But there was no realauthority, and criminal groups (the so-called Chechen Mafia) and armed radicals dominated. The resulting anarchy was one reason Russia felt that Chechnya, which was never a separate republic, could not become independent. Russia was also determined not to undermine its territorial integrity or to encourage other areas to secede.
In 1994, President Boris N. Yeltsin decided that Chechnya must again be under
Moscow's control, and later that year began a full military
intervention. The war shattered the Chechen economy and left behind armed, unemployed
and brutalized young Chechens. Atrocities committed by Russian troops also helped
radicalize ordinary Chechens.
Moreover, as with the Soviet-Afghan war, the conflict in Chechnya drew militants, and financial support, from across the Islamic world. The militants won local influence and helped the Chechens inflict heavy losses on Russian forces, leading to a 1996 agreement that gave Chechnya quasi-independence.
The chief Chechen general, Aslan Maskhadov, was easily elected president - Mr. Dudayev had been killed in a rocket attack - but other warlords and the militants defied him. Although Russia had initially supported President Maskhadov as an alternative to radical commanders like Shamil Basayev, it now views him as unreliable.
After the agreement was concluded, Chechnya became a base for kidnappers, who combined greed with hatred of Russia and the West. They kidnapped at least 1,100 people in neighboring areas of Russia, treating the victims with terrible cruelty.
In 1998, Islamists joined Chechen commanders and began a jihad to driveRussia from other areas of the Caucasus, including neighboring Dagestan, aiming to create a single Islamic republic.
After Russia defeated the jihadis in Dagestan in August 1999, bombs in Moscow and elsewhere killed more than 300 people. The attackers were never satisfactorily identified, but the Russian government blamed radical Chechens and Islamic militants.
In October 1999, Russia renewed its military intervention, a decision many analysts believe was driven partly by President Vladimir V. Putin's calculation that it would help him in the 2000 election.
However that may be, this savage war seems likely to continue, especially because
the divided Chechen resistance makes it hard to believe that, even if the Russian
and Chechen governments reached a settlement, peace would follow.
Anatol Lieven, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace in Washington, is author of “Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power”
About the Author
Former Senior Associate
- A Spreading Danger: Time for a New Policy Toward ChechnyaOther
Recent Work
More Work from Carnegie Europe
- Taking the Pulse: Enough with the Annual NATO Summits, Already?Commentary
Over the past ten years, NATO has held almost as many summits as it did during the entirety of the Cold War. Are they still useful, or is it time to stop holding annual meetings?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- How NATO Became Anchored in the Black SeaCommentary
As Russia's war on Ukraine drags on, NATO is expanding its footprint in the Black Sea. Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria are upgrading their fleets and deepening trilateral cooperation.
Dimitar Bechev
- Why Europe Cannot Negotiate a New Yalta with RussiaCommentary
While Russia is not ready to sue for peace on Europe’s terms, it could still either seek a ceasefire in Ukraine or try escalation. Brussels needs to prepare for both and prioritize that preparation over normative discussions.
Kadri Liik
- Managing Montreux: Turkey and the Russia-Ukraine War in the Black SeaArticle
For ninety years, Turkey has been positioned as the principal gatekeeper of Black Sea security. As a result, European and NATO efforts to support Ukraine will require closer engagement with Ankara.
Thomas de Waal
- Geopolitical Europe Needs Air-ConditioningCommentary
Western Europe’s dual-use infrastructure melted down during its latest heat wave. If a predicted hot weather event can take the continent by surprise, what chance does it have to withstand unexpected geopolitical crises?
Rym Momtaz