Paper
Matthew Rojansky
{
"authors": [
"Matthew Rojansky"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "russia",
"programs": [
"Russia and Eurasia"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Caucasus",
"Russia"
],
"topics": [
"Political Reform",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
In The Media
Is Putin's Victory Guaranteed?
It is not certain that Putin will win the elections on Sunday, but it is very likely. If Putin is elected, he will face implications in Russia's domestic policy and its relationship with the United States.
Published on Mar 2, 2012
Source: CTV (Canada)
- Medvedev: Putin has made promises that Medvedev will be Prime Minister after the elections. However, “whether Medvedev will stay as Prime Minister I think is unlikely,” said Rojansky, adding that “in some ways, he is the perfect fall guy down the road.”
- Domestic Reforms: Given the extensive protests against Putin’s rule, and the likelihood of renewed protests after the election, “Putin is going to do what he has to do,” said Rojansky. There will be a veneer of modernization and Putin will have to make concessions to some demands, such as improving modern technology and creating more opportunities for IT and high-tech jobs. However, “Putin cannot adjust the basic bargain he has made with the oligarchs and Russia’s elite,” warned Rojansky. "If he starts to shake up that deal, those guys will turn against him.”
- Syria: Once it is clear that the Assad regime is falling, Putin cannot sustain Russia’s major financial and security interests in Syria and has no further reason for Russia to continue to support the Assad regime. “If Putin will, in fact, win on Sunday, it becomes much less important for him to draw that line in the sand that says public protests should never be allowed to bring down what he considers to be a legitimate government,” added Rojansky.
- U.S.–Russia Relations: There is a good reason to believe that Putin will sustain the reset relationship with the United States, Rojansky stated.
About the Author
Matthew Rojansky
Former Deputy Director, Russia and Eurasia Program
Rojansky, formerly executive director of the Partnership for a Secure America, is an expert on U.S. and Russian national security and nuclear-weapon policies.
- An Opportunity for Ambition: Ukraine’s OSCE Chairmanship
- Presiding Over the OSCE: Challenges and OpportunitiesIn The Media
Matthew Rojansky
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Europe
- Letter from the Editor: Europe Takes Two Steps Forward But One Step BackCommentary
As we close out another season of Strategic Europe, it is worth taking stock of the deep shifts underway.
Rym Momtaz
- Assessing Information Ecosystems: How Governments Can Get Ahead of Hybrid ThreatsPaper
The hybrid warfare landscape is evolving rapidly, leaving policymakers without clear strategies. To better inform their work in addressing emerging challenges, governments must dig deeper into the underlying dynamics at play.
Raluca Csernatoni, Alicia Wanless
- Taking the Pulse: Are the EU’s Watered-Down Russia Sanctions Better than None?Commentary
The EU had to compromise to adopt a twenty-first sanctions package against Russia, exposing growing cracks in the union’s resolve. Is this latest, weaker round worth it to keep pressure on Moscow?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- Why Europe Must Take Charge of its Russia Diplomacy NowCommentary
Trump is distracted and Ukraine wants Europe to step up. The continent’s leaders must find their voice and assert it in talks with Russia.
Alissa de Carbonnel
- Why Russia Could Escalate Hybrid Warfare Against EuropeCommentary
Mounting economic strain and battlefield losses will not necessarily make the Kremlin less dangerous. They could instead push Moscow toward a more aggressive hybrid campaign designed to test NATO’s Eastern flank, exploit allied hesitation, and fracture European resolve.
Maksym Beznosiuk
