• Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Europe logoCarnegie lettermark logo
EUNATO
  • Donate
REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

Article

Commission Pulls Its Punches But Delivers Useful Proliferation Recommendations

The 9/11 commission concluded that any strategy to combat terrorism must be combined with a comprehensive effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Link Copied
By Alexis Orton and Joseph Cirincione
Published on Jul 22, 2004

After months of dramatic hearings, the 9/11 Commission issued a surprisingly timid report. The failure to detect or deter the September 11 attack is blamed on no one and everyone, including the American public for failing to demand more from their government. Still, the new study includes several key recommendations to reduce the possibility of nuclear terrorism. The commission concluded that any strategy to combat terrorism must be combined with a comprehensive effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. According to the commissioners, "The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons." Below we provide in full the report’s proliferation-related recommendation which the commissioners say "warrants a maximum effort" and is part of a "global strategy." All are also recommendations made in the new Carnegie report, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security:

Excerpt from Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons. As we note in chapter 2, al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years. In chapter 4, we mentioned officials worriedly discussing, in 1998, reports that Bin Ladin’s associates thought their leader was intent on carrying out a "Hiroshima."

These ambitions continue. In the public portion of his February 2004 worldwide threat assessment to Congress, DCI Tenet noted that Bin Ladin considered the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a "religious obligation." He warned that al Qaeda "continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability." Tenet added that "more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials."

A nuclear bomb can be built with a relatively small amount of nuclear material. A trained nuclear engineer with an amount of highly enriched uranium or plutonium about the size of a grapefruit or an orange, together with commercially available material, could fashion a nuclear device that would fit in a van like the one Ramzi Yousef parked in the garage of the World Trade Center in 1993. Such a bomb would level Lower Manhattan.

The coalition strategies we have discussed to combat Islamist terrorism should therefore be combined with a parallel, vital effort to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We recommend several initiatives in this area.

Strengthen Counterproliferation Efforts

While efforts to shut down Libya’s illegal nuclear program have been generally successful, Pakistan’s illicit trade and the nuclear smuggling networks of Pakistani scientist A.Q.Khan have revealed that the spread of nuclear weapons is a problem of global dimensions.

Attempts to deal with Iran’s nuclear program are still underway. Therefore, the United States should work with the international community to develop laws and an international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and prosecution of such smugglers by any state in the world where they do not disclose their activities.

Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative

In May 2003, the Bush administration announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): nations in a willing partnership combining their national capabilities to use military, economic, and diplomatic tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related technology.

The PSI can be more effective if it uses intelligence and planning resources of the NATO alliance. Moreover, PSI membership should be open to non-NATO countries. Russia and China should be encouraged to participate.

Support the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Outside experts are deeply worried about the U.S. government’s commitment and approach to securing the weapons and highly dangerous materials still scattered in Russia and other countries of the Soviet Union. The government’s main instrument in this area, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (usually referred to as "Nunn-Lugar," after the senators who sponsored the legislation in 1991), is now in need of expansion, improvement, and resources. The U.S. government has recently redoubled its international commitments to support this program, and we recommend that the United States do all it can, if Russia and other countries will do their part. The government should weigh the value of this investment against the catastrophic cost America would face should such weapons find their way to the terrorists who are so anxious to acquire them.

Recommendation: Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

About the Authors

Alexis Orton

Joseph Cirincione

Authors

Alexis Orton
Joseph Cirincione
SecurityForeign PolicyNuclear PolicyNuclear Energy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Europe

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    The EU Equivocating on Turkey Is Bad Geopolitics

    Following Ursula von der Leyen’s gaffe equating Turkey to Russia and China, relations with Ankara risk deteriorating even further. Without better, more consistent diplomatic messaging, how can the EU pretend to be a geopolitical power?

      Sinan Ülgen

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Is the EU Ready for Rapprochement With the UK?

    Closer EU-UK ties could help address urgent European concerns. But is the EU ready for rapprochement with the United Kingdom?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    France, Italy, and Spain Should Use Force in Lebanon

    Europe has been standing by while its Southern neighborhood is being redrawn by force. To establish a path to peace between Israel and Lebanon, it’s time for Europeans to get involved with hard power.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    The Fog of AI War

    In Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, AI warfare has come to dominate, with barely any oversight or accountability. Europe must lead the charge on the responsible use of new military technologies.

      Raluca Csernatoni

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    How to Join the EU in Three Easy Steps

    Montenegro and Albania are frontrunners for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, but they can’t just sit back and wait. To meet their 2030 accession ambitions, they must make a strong positive case.

      Dimitar Bechev, Iliriana Gjoni

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
Carnegie Europe logo, white
Rue du Congrès, 151000 Brussels, Belgium
  • Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Gender Equality Plan
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.