Exclusive: Israel Believes Iran Moved Nuclear Centrifuges Into Pickaxe Mountain

Laurence Norman, Anat Peled and Alexander Ward | Wall Street Journal

Israeli intelligence believes Iran moved thousands of uranium-enrichment centrifuges into tunnels deep inside a mountain last fall, Israeli and U.S. officials say, a development that would heighten concerns that Tehran could reconstitute its nuclear program. Israel passed along the intelligence findings to the U.S., saying the centrifuges were transferred to the Pickaxe Mountain site last fall after the 12-day war in June when American and Israeli strikes pummeled Iran’s three main nuclear sites.

Japan ‘cannot avoid’ nuclear weapons debate, defense chief Koizumi says

Jesse Johnson | The Japan Times

Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has urged Japan to more openly debate nuclear weapons’ role in the country’s defense, a rare instance of a sitting Cabinet member broaching the highly contentious issue. “While this is a difficult issue for Japan to discuss, one topic we cannot avoid is nuclear weapons,” Koizumi said during an online news program recorded Friday ahead of a trip to Europe. Koizumi’s remarks come as the government weighs updates to key documents outlining Japan’s security policy — including a possible revision of the country’s decades-old pledge not to produce, possess or host nuclear weapons. Formulated in 1967 and known formally as the country’s “three non-nuclear principles,” the pledge has consistently been upheld by governments since.

Nuclear deal that would permit uranium enrichment by Saudi Arabia in limbo awaiting Trump admin sign-off

Davis Winkle and Zachary Cohen | CNN

The Trump administration has tentatively agreed to allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium without enacting international safeguards intended to prevent nuclear weapons development, according to sources familiar with the matter and documents reviewed by CNN. The draft nuclear accord that outlines US support for Riyadh’s civilian nuclear program is awaiting President Donald Trump’s signature despite US-Saudi negotiations concluding in October 2025. Two sources familiar with the matter indicated that the ongoing war with Iran — which according to Trump was launched in part to prevent Tehran from using its enriched uranium to build nuclear weapons — has played a role in delaying Trump’s signature.

Satellite images show damage inside Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant

Al Jazeera | July 17, 2026

Satellite imagery reveals new damage inside Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant complex following the latest wave of US strikes during renewed military escalation between Washington and Tehran. A comparison of European Sentinel-2 satellite images captured on July 7 and July 12 shows newly formed impact scars inside the Bushehr complex, along with another apparent strike site within nearby support facilities. The open-source unit of Al Jazeera Network compiled satellite imagery, field footage and official data from the US Central Command (CENTCOM) to map the locations of US strikes across Iran between July 7 and July 15.

NASA’s nuclear Mars mission to cost over $2 billion

Audrey Decker | Politico

NASA administrator Jared Isaacman’s ambitious plans to build a nuclear-powered spacecraft and fly it to Mars will cost over $2 billion, the agency confirmed this week. The new cost estimate for the mission, dubbed Space Reactor-1 Freedom, comes as the agency juggles a number of high-profile missions — including returning humans to the Moon and building a lunar outpost — all while operating under what is expected to be a flat budget.

Forward deterrence: What’s (not) in it for France’s partners

Oliver Meier | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Macron’s proposal for a strengthened European nuclear deterrent seemed to square several circles for non-nuclear-weapon NATO members: It aims to bring French nuclear weapons closer into the European security equation, without angering Washington. … Four months on, things increasingly turn out not to be so simple. Implementation of the initiative is uneven, its level of ambition remains unclear, and questions remain around compatibility with the US nuclear extended deterrent. To address these problems, France’s non-nuclear partners should increase coordination among themselves on nuclear issues, rather than engage Paris on a one-to-one basis only. Earlier and better harmonization of their own positions would make it easier for them to pursue their own interests vis-à-vis Paris effectively. Increased coordination would also facilitate better alignment of the French concept of forward deterrence with NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements.