Proliferation News 7/28/26
IN THIS ISSUE: Is There a Future for US-Iran Nuclear Diplomacy?, Iran’s New Leader Is More Open to Pursuing a Nuclear Weapon, U.S. Intelligence Says, ‘There is no enrichment envisioned’ in Saudi nuclear deal, Waltz says, Rival Koreas race to build nuclear-powered submarines, Trump Is Pushing Nuclear Energy. His Family and Supporters Could Benefit., Balancing global uranium enrichment needs and proliferation risks: A framework
Is There a Future for US-Iran Nuclear Diplomacy?
Ariel E. Levite | The National Interest
With the resumption of hostilities this month, the US-Iran Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is now dead for all intents and purposes. And resumption of formal negotiations is not yet on the horizon. But when serious negotiations eventually take place, they will have to confront a slew of contentious issues among which two will dominate: navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program… Consequently, the United States now faces a critical challenge. How to prevent a nuclear slippery slope without diverting attention from the focus on Hormuz or requiring either a full-scale military operation or painstaking, endless negotiations.
Iran’s New Leader Is More Open to Pursuing a Nuclear Weapon, U.S. Intelligence Says
Julian E. Barnes | The New York Times
American intelligence agencies believe that Iran’s new supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, is far more interested than his father and predecessor in pursuing a nuclear weapon, according to officials briefed on the assessments. Ayatollah Khamenei’s father, who was killed at the start of the war in an Israeli attack aided by U.S. intelligence, had sworn off developing a nuclear weapon… His successor has never publicly called for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. But U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Mojtaba Khamenei and the harder-line government that emerged after the United States and Israel killed many of Iran’s previous leaders have ambitions to develop advanced nuclear weaponry.
‘There is no enrichment envisioned’ in Saudi nuclear deal, Waltz says
Cheyanne M. Daniels | Politico
U.N. Ambassador Mike Waltz on Sunday sought to clarify the parameters of the newly signed nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, while emphasizing in interviews that even as the “tenets” of the deal are in place, discussions are continuing to take place. In an appearance on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Waltz said, “We haven’t sold our nuclear technology in terms of small modular reactors, micro reactors, large reactors, in many, many decades.” And, he added, “There is no enrichment envisioned in this plan.”
Rival Koreas race to build nuclear-powered submarines
Daniel Tudor and Ian Bott | The Financial Times
It is a mark of South Korea’s hopes for its planned new nuclear-powered submarine that it decided to name the vessel after Jang Bogo, a ninth-century naval commander known as the “King of the Sea”… Analysts say the new submarine programme, announced in May, will intensify the fierce arms race between the rival ends of the highly militarised Korean peninsula. It could also change maritime calculations in the wider region at a time of rising geopolitical tensions.
Trump Is Pushing Nuclear Energy. His Family and Supporters Could Benefit.
Eric Lipton and Kate Kelly | The New York Times
The decision by President Trump to grant Saudi Arabia access to American nuclear technology aligns with his administration’s push to accelerate domestically backed nuclear power projects around the world. But it may also contribute to a major trend in Mr. Trump’s second term: allowing the government to help enrich the president, his family, advisers and others in his orbit… Here is a look at Mr. Trump and some of those with ties to him that could benefit from his nuclear goals.
Balancing global uranium enrichment needs and proliferation risks: A framework
Logan Mintz and Matthew Sharp | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
The Trump administration is pursuing two contradictory policies with uranium enrichment: It has insisted that zero uranium enrichment in Iran is necessary to achieve its goal of preventing Iranian access to a nuclear weapon. But the administration has also shown an apparent tolerance for the spread of the same uranium enrichment technology elsewhere as part of its push for expanded nuclear exports. There is an essential tension between the administration’s readiness to use military force to prevent enrichment in Iran while condoning the technology’s spread elsewhere.
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