Proliferation News 7/30/26
IN THIS ISSUE: Trump and Netanyahu explored all Iran options including attack, Israeli official says, 5 states offer to accept nuclear waste in exchange for help developing nuclear energy, South Korea to enshrine nuclear nonproliferation in submarine law, Nuclear revival needs $250bn a year, industry says, Parsing Trump’s Decision to (Maybe) Give Uranium Enrichment to Saudi Arabia, NATO’s Nuclear Types: Vulnerability, Defense Investment, and Alliance Strategy Preferences
Trump and Netanyahu explored all Iran options including attack, Israeli official says
Matt Spetalnick | Reuters/ Yahoo
U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explored all possible paths to curb Iran's nuclear program in their meeting, including diplomacy, economic pressure and force, a senior Israeli official said on Wednesday… Trump had voiced irritation with Netanyahu ahead of their meeting, complaining that details had surfaced publicly about the Israeli leader's plans to talk about new intelligence on Pickaxe Mountain, a deep-underground, nuclear-linked facility that Trump has threatened to bomb.
5 states offer to accept nuclear waste in exchange for help developing nuclear energy
Matthew Daily and Jennifer McDermott | Associated Press
Five states have agreed to accept nuclear waste from around the country in exchange for federal help developing nuclear energy to create thousands of jobs. The states — Tennessee, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Utah and Idaho — all have Republican governors who say they welcome the chance to help America reclaim its leadership in civilian nuclear energy. If built, the storage sites would represent significant progress in a multi-decade effort to store more than 95,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
South Korea to enshrine nuclear nonproliferation in submarine law
Hwang Joo-young | The Korea Herald
South Korea’s Defense Ministry is moving to prohibit nuclear fuel intended to power submarines from being diverted to nuclear weapons — an apparent move to address proliferation concerns surrounding the program. The ministry plans to issue a legislative notice for the proposed bill as early as Wednesday, according to officials Tuesday… If enacted, the bill would mark South Korea’s first explicit statutory prohibition on using nuclear material for the development, manufacture or possession of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear revival needs $250bn a year, industry says
Malcom Moore | The Financial Times
Global annual investment in nuclear power needs to triple to about $250bn if governments want to meet their stated energy goals, the industry’s main lobby group said as it urged banks to channel more private capital into the sector. Nuclear power has recently enjoyed a revival as countries around the world seek reliable low-carbon electricity to meet rapidly rising demand… But the industry continues to struggle to attract investment because new plants are expensive, take years to build and carry significant construction and political risks.
Parsing Trump’s Decision to (Maybe) Give Uranium Enrichment to Saudi Arabia
Richard Nephew | War on the Rocks
On June 22, the United States announced that it had signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. This type of agreement broadly authorizes trade in nuclear technology, equipment, and materials, but only if the agreement and the country in question meet defined nonproliferation requirements… But the legal terms of Section 123 are only the minimum requirements in law: On top of the legal standards are nonproliferation policies that have been held by the United States over the last few decades. Press reports indicate that the Trump administration has set aside some of the most important ones, including trying to prevent the spread of uranium enrichment technology, to get this nuclear deal over the line.
NATO’s Nuclear Types: Vulnerability, Defense Investment, and Alliance Strategy Preferences
Stephen Herzog, J. Luis Rodriguez, and Lauren Sukin | Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies
Members of nuclear alliances face myriad and complex demands. They must ensure that their nuclear-armed patron maintains adequate capabilities and resolve, while avoiding entrapment and entanglement. How, then, do states manage these competing needs? To address this question, we develop a typological theory of nuclear alliance members… We test these arguments using a public opinion survey conducted in ten current NATO member countries, fielded during a period of heightened nuclear salience in the Russo–Ukrainian War. The results reveal strong cross-national variation in public preferences regarding nuclear alliance management, thereby demonstrating the value of our typology in understanding dynamics within NATO.
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