Australia’s Reckoning: The Trade-offs of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Celia McDowall | Survival

Growing strategic threats and doubts about the reliability of US security guarantees are prompting many US allies to reconsider their reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence. Australia, however, is not among them. Canberra is instead doubling down on its alliance with the United States, deepening military integration and increasing its contribution to US nuclear operations. In doing so, it seeks to secure American commitment to Australian and regional security. This approach reflects a long-standing bargain: Australia accepts various risks associated with supporting US nuclear deterrence, including exposure to direct nuclear threat, in exchange for the security benefits of a credible American guarantee.

Trump and Xi agreed on “strategic stability.” They now need to decide what it means

Tong Zhao | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

When Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping meet in Washington this week, one phrase demands particular attention: the “constructive relationship of strategic stability” they agreed to pursue in May. Beijing hailed the language as a historic diplomatic achievement, one that could redefine the world’s most consequential bilateral relationship of this new century. But the two leaders never agreed on what “strategic stability” means or will require.

Trump denies offering Iran sanctions relief for nuclear concessions

Kanishka Singh | Reuters

US ​President Donald Trump on Monday denied offering Iran sanctions relief and ‌the release of frozen funds in return for nuclear concessions from Tehran. "This is untrue. I offered them NOTHING," Trump wrote on Truth Social, responding to ​an Axios report that cited US officials as saying that ​he was willing to give Iran sanctions relief and ⁠release Iranian frozen funds in return for "concrete" Iranian steps regarding ​the nuclear program. The Axios report did not identify the US officials. CNN ​also reported, citing an unidentified US official, that Trump was willing to give Iran sanctions relief and release frozen funds as part of a final deal ​on the condition that Iran offered "concrete progress" on the nuclear ​issue.

How to Fix the US-Saudi Nuclear 123 Agreement

Ariel E. Levite and Matthew Sharp | The National Interest

Congress can fix most of the problems with the nuclear agreement without simply rejecting it. Last month, the Trump administration submitted a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress. It will enter into force by the end of the year unless Congress acts to prevent it. The agreement has obvious shortcomings from a nonproliferation perspective, and its touted benefits seem highly uncertain, leading some to advocate that Congress should prevent its entry into force via a joint resolution of disapproval. But any attempt to pass such a joint measure is unlikely to succeed. Fortunately, over the longer term, Congress has other means to shape the agreement’s implementation better to align it with US interests, nonproliferation and otherwise.

The THAAD Delusion

Christopher Leonard | The Atlantic

In the war with Iran, the THAAD has worked precisely as designed—but not at all as promised. The system performed well in the early days of the conflict, intercepting Iranian ballistic missiles with impressive accuracy. But the U.S. has not destroyed many of Iran’s missile launchers, and the war is far from over. And despite planning for just such a conflict for two decades, the U.S. failed to take the steps necessary to convert the THAAD into a system that could provide protection for as long as it would be relied upon to do so.

Turkey: Ankara’s Nuclear Ambitions in the Post-Iran War Environment

Gönül Tol | Middle East Institute

In February 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggested that shifting international dynamics could push Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons, reigniting a decades-old debate over Ankara’s nuclear ambitions. Foreign Minister Fidan’s remarks are only the latest in a series of public statements in which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other Turkish officials have increasingly challenged nonproliferation norms and even hinted at an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. That rhetoric, combined with Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy and research programs and its indigenous surface-to-surface missile development projects, has fueled concerns that these capabilities could eventually form the backbone of a Turkish nuclear weapons program.