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Yermak’s Resignation Has Changed the Landscape of Ukrainian Politics

The chief of staff’s resignation may have eased political tensions in Ukraine, but it has not yet resolved any of the accumulated problems.

Published on December 3, 2025

Andriy Yermak’s forced resignation as head of Ukraine’s presidential administration is a major event in Ukrainian politics. It is a challenge not only to President Volodymyr Zelensky personally, but also to the entire super-presidential system of power that Zelensky has been building since his first days in office. The toppling of the seemingly omnipotent presidential favorite creates both an opportunity to create more balance among the branches of power and the risk of a descent into chaos.

Yermak had been demonized ever since the “Wagnergate” scandal in the summer of 2020, when a Ukrainian intelligence operation to capture Russian mercenaries was canceled—allegedly on Yermak’s orders. Since then, Yermak has been dubbed a master of behind-the-scenes intrigue and evil genius of Ukrainian politics, and has come under unrelenting criticism from his opponents for the enormous influence he acquired and for placing his people throughout the system.

The problem wasn’t just Yermak himself. The constant struggle between the country’s presidents and parliament has long made the presidential administration, with its vague and undefined powers, the country’s main power center under ambitious leaders. But Yermak’s rise was also fueled by Zelensky’s building of a super-presidential model of government in Ukraine as an alternative to the corrupt parliamentary system of which the oligarchs had seized control. This centralized system was then further strengthened by a series of crises: the COVID pandemic in 2020, the war against the oligarchs (2020–2021), the Russian military threat (2021), and, finally, full-scale war.

Within this system, the decisionmaking center inevitably shifted to the president’s inner circle, and the head of the presidential administration automatically became the country’s de facto second in command.

Zelensky—a successful actor but newcomer to politics—needed someone beside him with a similar background, to whom he could speak plainly. Yermak, a former film producer with little political experience but major managerial ambitions, was the perfect fit. He was simultaneously an all-powerful courtier and a lightning rod for negativity.

Zelensky and Yermak worked well as a duo for many years, weathering major crises. But the attack on independent anti-corruption agencies in the summer of 2025 proved a fatal mistake.

This ill-advised undertaking was prompted by a mixture of motives: a desire to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty against the pressure of its Western allies (the agencies in question were established back in 2015 on Western recommendations), a wish to protect the president’s inner circle from investigations, and, finally, a simple overestimation of the regime’s own power. By taking on the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the presidential team had hoped for a quick domestic political victory, but instead was forced to backtrack hastily when it prompted indignation from Ukrainian society, the opposition, and the country’s Western allies.

Several months later, NABU published tapes exposing large-scale corruption within the president’s inner circle. Although, initially, the chief of staff was not directly implicated in the scandal, reports were soon leaked that the “Ali Baba” mentioned in the tapes was none other than Yermak. The recordings also suggested that it was Yermak who may have ordered the security services to launch the attack on the anti-corruption agencies back in the summer, though no formal charges have been brought against him.

Even after not only the opposition, but also some of the president’s allies began demanding Yermak’s resignation, Zelensky fought to the bitter end for his chief of staff. The president managed to suppress a rebellion within his own Servant of the People parliamentary faction after making it clear he would not make personnel decisions under pressure. He then appointed Yermak head of the delegation negotiating U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan. But, ultimately, the scandal proved too great for Yermak to remain in office.

Following searches of Yermak’s residence, the president finally parted with his chief of staff, without waiting for charges to be brought against him. None of Yermak’s numerous protégés in the corridors of power risked publicly defending him. Most of them tried to distance themselves from their now-toxic patron, and some even took part in his ousting.

Immediately after Yermak’s resignation, the search began for his replacement, but a shallow pool of reserves is another problem Zelensky’s team has been battling from the start. Potential candidates are either themselves protégés of Yermak (which would inevitably fuel rumors that he continues to rule through them), or also being investigated for corruption, or already hold important posts in which they would be hard to replace.

In short, Yermak’s resignation may have eased political tensions in the country, but it has not yet resolved any of the problems that have accumulated.

Regardless of who takes over as chief of staff, they will no longer enjoy the same level of trust from the president, and are unlikely to become as influential as Yermak. The latter’s departure has left Zelensky all alone at the top, and without Yermak to act as a shock absorber, any negativity will now fall directly on the president himself. That will impact Zelensky’s chances of reelection when new elections can eventually be held.

Meanwhile, in the absence of any democratic rotation, Zelensky will undoubtedly try to seize the moment to launch yet another “reset” of his team and create a sense of renewal. Yermak’s resignation could also have an impact on foreign policy: he could be portrayed as a hawk who supposedly stymied the Americans’ proposals for compromise, opening a window of opportunity for Ukraine to make concessions.

Those among the presidential team who resented Yermak’s dictatorship will no doubt attempt to use the situation to reshape the government. Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko and the leader of the Servant of the People faction David Arakhamia—with the support of their parliamentary majority—may attempt to make the system more balanced by restoring the authority of the cabinet and parliament. There will also likely be a personnel purge among the regional authorities, which are full of Yermak’s protégés.

The opposition, meanwhile, senses Zelensky’s weakness and is set to keep pressuring the president. One of its goals is to form a new government that would include opposition parties.

The most radical scenario could see the Servant of the People faction lose its parliamentary majority. Following a series of schisms and purges, the number of the party’s deputies has already shrunk from 254 to 229. If four more leave, the pro-presidential party will lose its majority, which could lead to the resignation of the government and the formation of a new coalition in parliament. It could also cause Servant of the People to fragment into various interest groups.

Such a turn of events could also result in the election of a new parliamentary speaker with more agency than the current presidential loyalist, Ruslan Stefanchuk. Under the Ukrainian constitution, if the president should lose power, the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada becomes acting president, just as Oleksandr Turchynov did in 2014 when then president Viktor Yanukovych fled the country amid the Maidan revolution.

Such a scenario could either form the basis for a new patriotic consensus, or exacerbate political divisions and lead to further chaos. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly said that the Verkhovna Rada is the only Ukrainian institution he considers legitimate. He appears to be hoping for an intra-parliamentary coup that would result in a new Ukrainian president whom the Kremlin would find more pliable. But with the risks of such a development obvious to both the Ukrainian government and the opposition, no one in Kyiv is in any hurry to take any drastic steps.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.