Preparations for the upcoming State Duma elections on September 18–20 are taking place amid an unprecedented crisis in President Vladimir Putin’s power vertical. Previously, the authorities have always focused the campaign on preserving the status quo. But the current situation is extremely uncomfortable for both the elites and society. The protracted war in Ukraine makes it hard to tout stability as an achievement, while the stalled career elevator means there is no motivation for the bureaucracy and influential groups. Finally, voters are not getting the material incentive ahead of the elections to which they have become accustomed under Putinism.

An election campaign in today’s Russia is a rare legitimate excuse for a limited public discussion on the present and future: for example, on the prospects of change in the most senior posts. There is very clear appetite for such a discussion in Russian society: otherwise, the ratings of the largely forgotten liberal opposition party Yabloko would not have risen so sharply that the Kremlin saw fit to ban it from running in the elections.

Putin’s regime, however, refuses point blank to enter into a discussion about the future, prompting debate over the prospects of Putinism and exacerbating the feeling of political uncertainty. 

Compared with presidential elections, in which convenient sparring partners for Putin are usually allowed to run, the parliamentary campaign has more room for maneuver, even under Russian authoritarianism. All the parties taking part have a vested interest in expanding their share of the vote to secure a better position in their future dealings with the Kremlin.

The disqualification of Yabloko, which had begun attracting support from unhappy voters even without waging a large-scale campaign, shows that any alternative proposal to the Kremlin’s agenda today—especially an anti-war platform—will be popular among some sections of society. For this reason, even in-system political forces (those represented in the Duma, who are largely loyal to Putin) are no longer so scared to talk about the country’s problems and are raising increasingly sensitive issues (within the accepted limitations, of course).  

The simplest and most effective tactic for the in-system opposition is to campaign for the overturning of unpopular measures and a return to pre-war “normality.” The New People and Communist parties, for example, are actively campaigning against the internet blackouts that have become a frequent occurrence.

Some individual deputies have touched on even more sensitive topics. Renat Suleimanov, a Communist deputy for the Novosibirsk region, said in an interview with local media that the Russian economy “would not withstand a long continuation of the ‘special military operation,’” as Moscow refers to the war in Ukraine. His fellow party member Vyacheslav Markhayev called on the authorities for a “clear plan” to end the war, since “Russia is on the brink of social upheaval.”

In previous election cycles, there was far less room for this kind of protest rhetoric. Before the war, the Kremlin and the ruling party, United Russia, were able to offer the public “Putin-era stability” and the preservation of the relatively prosperous status quo. The authorities tried to time the launch of major infrastructure and social projects around elections. Regional and municipal leaders also prepared “gifts” for voters in the form of renovating schools, hospitals, and roads.

In 2025, however, the economic situation started to deteriorate. Both federal and regional budgets are facing serious deficits. Far from being able to buy voters, in some places—even well-off regions like Krasnoyarsk and Moscow— the authorities are starting to close schools, hospitals, and kindergartens. Problems with public transport are on the rise.

In these circumstances, United Russia’s only option is to console voters with promises that it will at least partly preserve the stability of the past. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, who is number two on the party list, has said calls to put the Russian economy on a purely wartime footing are “worthless.” But he can’t go any further, because both he and the ruling party, as well as the party’s Kremlin overseers, are all hostages of Putin’s will, and the president is determined to continue to wage war, regardless of the consequences and cost.

Kremlin political strategists privately admit that Russian society sees the format of parliamentary elections as a legitimate channel for expressing frustration. For this reason, even those who support Putin may vote against United Russia.

There are also plenty of reasons for the elites to feel frustrated. They have long been disillusioned by the lack of opportunities for career progression in the corridors of power, and are hungry for change. While the State Duma doesn’t determine the composition of either the government or the presidential administration, the post-election period has traditionally been a time for reshuffles.

The elites were hoping for a major shakeup as far back as following the previous Duma elections in 2021, but that never happened, and then the full-scale war broke out. Now they look set to be disappointed once again. The race for the position of State Duma speaker already appears to be over now that former president Dmitry Medvedev is no longer in the running. The locomotives of United Russia are mainly federal ministers and governors who will clearly remain in their posts after the election.

The rapid closing of windows of professional opportunity that may not open again for a long time is forcing the elites to redouble their efforts, causing the interests of various influence groups to start to collide. There is growing speculation that Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin could be replaced, along with certain ministers and presidential administration officials who have been in their posts for a long time.

Such talk adds to the overall feeling that the power vertical is growing weaker and that divisions within it are growing stronger. Together with high-profile critical comments by deputies—who are also perceived as representatives of the power vertical—this is creating an atmosphere of crisis and decline.

When added to the president’s age and his dubious decisions and comments, it breeds questions whether the regime could exist without him. While Sobyanin tries to turn around United Russia’s low ratings by reassuring the war-weary public, Putin has said that the “heroes of the ‘special military operation’” have enabled Russians to “feel what Russia is.” And at the height of the gasoline crisis in Russia caused by Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries, the president openly said that he had rejected a Ukrainian proposal for a moratorium on attacks behind the frontlines.

The Putin system is already struggling to exist with Putin at its helm. The power vertical has no answer to the question of how to survive without him. In the discussions made possible by the State Duma election campaign, one question is being asked more and more loudly. “What next?” The election may be entirely controlled, but the unfolding crisis is still making it a platform for a real discussion of a vision for the future—or at the very least, of how to return to previous normality.