MENA Trade Agreements with the West Strengthen Negative Perceptions of Globalization
Free trade agreements between the West (U.S. and EU) and Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, while containing beneficial elements, have strengthened negative perceptions of “western-led globalization” because they benefit unpopular elites and impose serious short term economic adjustment.
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Published on Jun 24, 2008
BEIRUT, June 24—Free trade agreements between the West (U.S. and EU) and Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, while containing beneficial elements, have strengthened negative perceptions of “western-led globalization” because they benefit unpopular elites and impose serious short term economic adjustment, concludes Riad al Khouri, a Carnegie Middle East Center economist specializing in MENA countries.
Examining the socio-economic and political effects of American and European trade agreements on Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt in EU and U.S. Free Trade Agreements in the Middle East and North Africa, al Khouri notes the more active pursuit of FTAs as an economic policy tool with political goals by the United States and the European Union in recent years.
Key Findings:
Trade between the United States and MENA countries grew in a relatively balanced manner, while FTAs between the EU and the Mediterranean region favored the EU.
Bilateral security cooperation between the United States and MENA countries strengthened after signing free trade agreements.
The United States is keen on full trade agreements with MENA countries, in contrast to the EU, whose agreements with MENA countries do not include agriculture and immigration.
If the EU and MENA countries could come to a broader agreement on liberalizing agricultural products and promoting controlled immigration, the Southern Mediterranean region would benefit greatly.
He concludes:
“The current U.S. and EU initiatives are a step in the right direction, but they alone cannot lead to robust, sustainable growth in the MENA region or create regional stability. The overall growth and precarious stability that the region has been able to achieve still has little to do with bilateral economic links with the U.S. or the EU. Nevertheless, FTAs and similar agreements show signs of increasing importance for both the West and the MENA region, with implications for EU and U.S. trade relations with other regions as well.”
Riad al Khouriis a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Middle East Center based in Beirut, Lebanon. He has undertaken extensive research on regional trade and political economy, among other topics, and writes widely about development issues.
The Carnegie Middle East Center is a public policy think tank and research center based in Beirut, Lebanon. Bringing together senior researchers from the region, the Carnegie Middle East Center aims to better inform the process of political change in the Middle East and deepen understanding of the issues the region and its people face.
The Carnegie Middle East Program combines in-depth local knowledge with incisive comparative analysis to examine economic, socio-political, and strategic interests in the Arab world. Through detailed country studies and the exploration of key cross-cutting themes, the Carnegie Middle East Program, in coordination with the Carnegie Middle East Center, provides analysis and recommendations in both English and Arabic that are deeply informed by knowledge and views from the region. The Carnegie Middle East Program has special expertise in political reform and Islamist participation in pluralistic politics throughout the region.
The Arab Reform Bulletin addresses political reform in the Middle East. Sent monthly, it offers analysis from U.S.-based and Middle Eastern political experts in English and Arabic, as well as news synopses and resource guides.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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