Source: Il Sole 24 Ore

During the recent U.S. presidential campaign, Moscow did not have a dog it favored. John McCain was scarier, but simpler, solidly advised (by Henry Kissinger, among others), and could only be better than he sounded on the campaign trail. Some in Russia hoped he would take America to even lower depths than Bush, which agreed with the Kremlin’s global worldview. Barack Obama, by contrast, came as a totally unknown quality, hard to read, and flanked by some of the same people who managed the Bill-Boris show. Also, making America more popular in the world, restoring its moral authority and renewing its claim to global leadership, did not exactly appeal to the Russian leadership.

President Medvedev pointedly ignored an opportunity to congratulate Obama on his election. Moreover, he publicly lashed out at the U.S. foreign policy in his first annual address to parliament. He threatened deploying Russian SS-26 (Iskander) missiles in Kaliningrad, if Washington did not cancel plans for BMD in Central Europe. Toughness is almost palpalable, but it looks more like tactics. On the next day he called Obama, had a chat with the President-elect, which he described as constructive, and visited a St. Petersburg car factory owned by the ailing U.S. auto giant, GM. An early summit with the 44th U.S. President is now in the works.

Russia’s binary leadership, however, has obviously decided to give Obama no honeymoon. Moscow’s good graces, Putin and Medvedev believe, are not to be taken for granted: rather, they must be deserved. For starters, then, it is no smiles, just hard talk. The world, according to the Kremlin, is about competition, not cooperation, and, with Americans, anyway, it is best to talk tough, and from a position of strength: otherwise, they will not take you seriously.

Toughness does not mean confrontation: there are no resources, and no appetite for it. Moscow wants attention (and would go to great lengths to get it), and an accommodation with Washington - on its own terms. The really top issues on the Kremlin agenda are three: Ukraine’s bid to join NATO; BMD deployments in Poland and the Czech republic; and Georgia. If the U.S. backs off on Ukraine (citing, very plausibly, the domestic political confusion in that country, and its population’s unwillingness to join the Alliance); if a deal could be struck on missile defenses (by reviving Putin’s 2007 offer of a pan-European BMD system, or at least by giving Russia permanent presence at the central European sites); if Georgia could be rehabilitated outside of the NATO framework, and in a loose confederacy, at most, with the sovereign Abkhazia and south Ossetia, the immediate sources of conflict would be put to rest.

Other issues on the Russian agenda include START and, more broadly, arms control, including the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. When Medvedev talks about a new security architecture for Europe, he means a framework which would go beyond the present NATO/EU-centered arrangement which pulls others in, and offers only a rickety footbridge to the one outsider, Russia.

This potentially suggests a profound disconnect between the Obama and Medvedev/Putin administrations. Moscow pursues an essentially geopolitical agenda. Turf matters, and great powers’ backyards are no-go areas for strangers. The world order is essentially a pecking order, rather than governance. Moscow has made some noises about reforming the world’s financial architecture, but they essentially boil down, again, to Russia and other emerging powers increasing their influence on global policy-making. On a number of issues relevant to the Obama administration, such as energy and climate change, Russia’s interests are not exactly identical to those of the U.S., and forward-looking ideas are even more scarce.

On the crucial issue of Iran, Russia advocates engagement rather than sanctions, and forswears the use of force. Moscow should not be expected to follow Washington’s lead on Iran, but will claim co-leadership. There are two problems, however. One is that Russia’s leverage with Iran is limited; the other one, that Moscow is hardly interested in a genuine reconciliation between Tehran and Washington, which would reduce Russia’s economic and strategic opportunities in the Middle East. On the plus side, however, is the hard truth that visible U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran would aid the moderates within the Islamic republic, while a sharp rift between Washington and Moscow would embolden the radicals. In any event, however, what matters most is America’s own policy toward Iran. 

With Obama in the White House, Russian-American relations are likely to be interesting, if rocky. The ongoing financial and economic crisis makes the situation everywhere highly volatile. The good thing about the crisis, however, is that it transported the champions of the Great Game and the Cassandras of a new Cold War from their beloved 19th-20th centuries models into the interconnected and interdependent reality of the present. U.S.-Russian relations are unlikely to rise to the level of a strategic partnership, solemnly proclaimed, but never practiced, but it would be good for both countries, and for Europe, if they gained a degree of stability and mutual confidence. In the past, leaders in both capitals that started with high expectations about the other country were subsequently disappointed. Medvedev and Obama are taking a low start. Good luck to them.