• Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Europe logoCarnegie lettermark logo
EUUkraine
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Alexey Arbatov"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Russia",
    "Western Europe"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Security"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Are Iskander Missiles Secretly Deployed by Russia Along Western Border?

No agreement prohibits deploying of Iskander missiles along Russia western border, but it makes the military situation tense. It appears that Russia chose the path of escalation in relations with NATO.

Link Copied
By Alexey Arbatov
Published on Dec 20, 2013

Source: Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal

Rumors about the scheduled or actual deployment of Iskander missiles have been circulating for a long time. Actually, no agreement prohibits such a step if it indeed took place. Iskander missiles are not subject to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, since their range is less than 500 km. But, of course, it makes the military situation tense. Russia has long planned to take this step in response to the completion of the third phase of the U.S. missile defense program, which is to deploy missile interceptors in Poland. Although this deployment has not happened yet, Russian missiles are stationed there in order to target interceptor bases (radar installations and missile deployment sites).

At the press conference at December 19, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized, that “we have not actually taken such a decision yet.” At the same time, he noted about the Iskanders, that “they are just one possible response and certainly not the most effective, though in their particular class they are the most effective weapons system in the world.”

While this may be a possible explanation of the current events, one must note that what is happening now simply escalates tensions and is absolutely unwarranted. It is hard to imagine a scenario under which Iskander missiles would strike a NATO member that hosts interceptor bases. Moreover, the missiles to be deployed in Poland after 2015 are not the advanced missiles that could have been deployed in that country and on warships in the northern seas around 2020 as part of the fourth phase of the missile defense program. These missiles might potentially intercept Russian intercontinental missiles, and their possible deployment once caused a panic reaction. But the interceptors that are to be deployed in Poland are significantly less technically advanced and effective, and they surely pose no threat to Russian long-range missiles—even in terms of their technical capabilities. The missiles that were to be deployed during the fourth phase of the NATO plan also did not pose any significant threat to Russia, but this phase has now been canceled.

It is clear that Russia chose the path of escalation. Putin was again very critical of NATO’s missile defense program, linking it to the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear projects and saying that the missile defense system seeks to undermine Russia’s defensive capabilities. But this is clearly a political campaign that has no strategic or technical basis. Apparently, it was decided to continue escalating tensions in this area.

It remains to be seen how the West might respond to these developments. Of course, the Iskanders are not the only bone of contention; the Ukrainian situation will also affect how the West will act. It is possible that the response may be offensive rather than defensive. For example, a large contingent of strike aircraft may be stationed in Poland or the Baltic countries. This contingent will be capable of conventional and nuclear strikes against all of European Russia. It is also possible to create Iskander-like missile systems if the West so chooses. This is unlikely in the foreseeable future, but it could be done, theoretically.

The missiles to be deployed in Poland during the third stage are intended to intercept Iranian missiles flying over Poland toward Great Britain or the United States, as well as missiles directed at Poland itself. Incidentally, these targets include Iskander missiles. Of course, Iskander missiles were not the original targets of the missile defense system, since the decision to deploy it in Poland was made before the rumors about Iskanders surfaced; nevertheless, the interceptors now have a new target. Russian scientists constantly boast that an Iskander missile will never be intercepted, but no such tests were conducted, so Russia should not jump the gun here. For the sake of curiosity, NATO and Russia could conduct such a duel in the form of a test to see if the missiles can in fact be intercepted. It is quite possible, although such tests are not likely to be conducted.

This article originally appeared in Russian in Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal.

About the Author

Alexey Arbatov

Alexey Arbatov is the head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Alexey Arbatov

Alexey Arbatov is the head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Alexey Arbatov
SecurityRussiaWestern Europe

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Europe

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Does the EU Have a Germany Problem?

    Are Germany’s economic, industrial, and political struggles becoming a liability for the EU’s ability to rise to the geopolitical moment?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    The Speech Ursula von der Leyen Can’t Deliver

    European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is about to give her annual address on the state of the EU. Here’s what she won’t—but should—say.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Von der Leyen Antonio Costa EU Europe
    Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Europe’s Self-Confidence Problem

    The EU’s responses to two recent incidents expose the gulf between European perceptions and capabilities. Unless the union can bridge that gap, it will never become a real geostrategic power.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Pituffik base greenland US Denmark
    Article
    Europe’s Overseas Countries and Territories as Geopolitical Assets

    European states control several Overseas Countries and Territories around the world that carry strategic, economic, and environmental weight. As great powers challenge the rules-based order, defending them is a geopolitical imperative for Europe.

      Marc Pierini

  • Europe far right MAGA Trump
    Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Why MAGA’s Far-Right European Ties Will Endure

    In supporting Europe’s far-right, MAGA and Russia both want the same thing: a weaker EU. Europe must defend itself without abandoning the openness these forces exploit.

      • Armida van rij

      Armida van Rij

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
Carnegie Europe logo, white
Rue du Congrès, 151000 Brussels, Belgium
  • Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Gender Equality Plan
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.