• Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Europe logoCarnegie lettermark logo
EUUkraine
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Petr Topychkanov"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "United States",
    "South Asia",
    "India"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Security",
    "Military",
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Commentary
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Will Delhi and Washington Be Able to Transform Defense Cooperation?

Indian and U.S. leaders recently discussed military-technological cooperation. Time will tell whether the countries will be ready to transform their cooperation by translating words into actions.

Link Copied
By Petr Topychkanov
Published on Oct 2, 2014

The prospects for military-technological cooperation were among the topics that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed with President Barack Obama, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, and other representatives of American political and military industrial circles.

At first glance, New Delhi and Washington are tasked with renewing the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, signed in 2005 by the Indian Defense Minister (the country’s current president), Pranab Mukherjee, and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. For its part, the 2005 agreement replaced the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations Between the United States and India signed in 2005.

Milan Vaishnav correctly points out that today, ”India clearly wants to invest in the opportunity of having co-production, co-development of defense technology.” That is exactly what the Modi government is trying to accomplish by signing the new defense framework agreement in 2015. If it is signed, it will be a great improvement on the 2005 agreement that only allowed for the two-way defense trade.

Of course, back in 2005, Pranab Mukherjee and other Indian proponents of the military-technological cooperation with the United States also hoped that the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Relationship would allow India and the United States to co-develop and co-produce weapons and military equipment in addition to the two-way trade. But despite the loud pronouncements, India and the United States have not a single joint defense project to show for since the agreement was signed.

Moreover, in all these years, India and the United States could not agree on the common principles for the transfer of military technologies, which had an adverse effect on the scale of their military-technological cooperation. India was not prepared to sign technology safeguard agreements that are an integral part of the military-technological cooperation between the United States and other countries. As a result, the parties had to settle for a case-by-case approach that enabled them to sign a number of agreements on the sales of American weapons and military equipment to India. This approach does not resolve the issue of safeguards in future deals between India and the United States.

Indian and American leaders have also demonstrated their intention to co-develop and co-produce weapons and military equipment in the past, but this intention now raises more serious questions. Are the current Indian leaders able to carry out these intentions—first on paper and subsequently by jointly developing and producing specific weaponry and military equipment? Are India and the United States prepared for the level of trust that exists between other countries that jointly develop military technologies (for instance, the United States and Israel, the European Union members, China and Pakistan, and, finally, Russia and India)?

We are still unable to answer these questions. As Ashley Tellis wrote on the eve of Modi’s U.S. visit, referring to the problems facing the Indian-American relations, ”none of these challenges can be resolved overnight or through a single visit by a prime minister.”  However, Indian and U.S. leaders will be forced to answer these questions in the next few years. The new defense framework agreement that New Delhi and Washington may sign next year, as well as the resulting contracts, will demonstrate the seriousness of the parties’ intentions to jointly produce and develop weapons and military equipment.

While assessing the prospects of their military-technological cooperation between India and the United States high figures should not be emphasised. The parties may increase the volume of their cooperation without qualitatively changing its nature. While the countries’ officials may boast the record amounts of their deals, these will still be the sales of American weapons and military equipment to India (albeit based on the offset schemes that allow for certain localization of production).

The Russian experience however indicates that such military-technological cooperation with India may lead to a stable presence on the Indian arms market only for a relatively short period of time. Such presence cannot be maintained without a qualitatively different level of cooperation.  This is precisely the reason for the deepening of the Russian-Indian military-technological cooperation illustrated by the successful cruise missile, atomic submarine, and aircraft carrier projects. But the Russian experience also reveals all of the difficulties on the path to developing cooperation and the failures the parties may encounter along this path.

Time will tell whether India and the United States will in fact be ready to transform their military-technological cooperation by translating words into actions.

About the Author

Petr Topychkanov

Former Fellow, Nonproliferation Program, Moscow Center

Topychkanov was a fellow in the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program.

    Recent Work

  • In The Media
    Iranian and Russian Perspectives on the Global System

      Petr Topychkanov

  • In The Media
    Premonition of Nuclear Threat

      Petr Topychkanov

Petr Topychkanov
Former Fellow, Nonproliferation Program, Moscow Center
Petr Topychkanov
SecurityMilitaryForeign PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesSouth AsiaIndia

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Europe

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Is France’s New Nuclear Doctrine Ambitious Enough?

    French President Emmanuel Macron has unveiled his country’s new nuclear doctrine. Are the changes he has made enough to reassure France’s European partners in the current geopolitical context?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

  • Commentary
    The Iran War’s Dangerous Fallout for Europe

    The drone strike on the British air base in Akrotiri brings Europe’s proximity to the conflict in Iran into sharp relief. In the fog of war, old tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean risk being reignited, and regional stakeholders must avoid escalation.

      Marc Pierini

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    The EU Needs a Third Way in Iran

    European reactions to the war in Iran have lost sight of wider political dynamics. The EU must position itself for the next phase of the crisis without giving up on its principles.

      Richard Youngs

  • Trump United Nations multilateralism institutions 2236462680
    Article
    Resetting Cyber Relations with the United States

    For years, the United States anchored global cyber diplomacy. As Washington rethinks its leadership role, the launch of the UN’s Cyber Global Mechanism may test how allies adjust their engagement.

      • Christopher Painter

      Patryk Pawlak, Chris Painter

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Global Instability Makes Europe More Attractive, Not Less

    Europe isn’t as weak in the new geopolitics of power as many would believe. But to leverage its assets and claim a sphere of influence, Brussels must stop undercutting itself.

      Dimitar Bechev

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
Carnegie Europe logo, white
Rue du Congrès, 151000 Brussels, Belgium
  • Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Gender Equality Plan
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.