China’s recent destruction of its own low-orbit weather satellite by a ground-based ballistic missile is highly significant, for many reasons.  But the fact that it occurred should surprise no one.  Given the existing potential for future political-military crises between Washington and Beijing (over Taiwan and other issues), America’s enormous lead in virtually all aspects of military power, the heavy U.S. reliance on satellites for  military purposes, and the absence of any formal agreement on the weaponization of outer space, it is little wonder that the Chinese are attempting to acquire anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities to try to even the playing field.  To defense analysts, the most surprising aspect of the test was the accuracy it displayed.   Although accomplished by Washington and Moscow decades ago, it is no mean feat to strike an object the size of a refrigerator over 500 miles in space with a ground-based missile.  This has caused some observers to increase their concern that China might be more capable than expected in other military-related areas as well.

But of greater concern are the troubling implications that the Chinese ASAT test, and the larger US stance toward the weaponization of space, pose for the management of future US-China political-military crises.  Most experts on crisis management emphasize the need for parties in a crisis---or in a situation that could lead to a crisis---to communicate clearly and directly, to strive to understand the motives, interests, and fears of their counterpart, and to anticipate the likely adverse consequences of any actions they might take.  They also stress the need for the civilian political leadership to supervise and control the actions of their military.  Without such effective internal controls, the military could precipitate a crisis, or worsen an existing one.  While the ASAT test was not a crisis per se, it is noteworthy that all of these maxims were apparently violated.

Little meaningful communication has thus far occurred between Washington and Beijing over China’s efforts to develop a credible ASAT capability.  Although, during the recent Chinese missile firing, each side avoided communicating in ways that made the situation worse, the fact is that US has known of Chinese efforts to develop an ASAT capability for a long time, and knew the Chinese had fired ballistic missiles toward their own satellite on several occasions last year.  But rather than raise the issue immediately with Beijing, Washington silently monitored each shot and then, once the Chinese destroyed the satellite, apparently leaked the event and are now encouraging an adverse global response designed to force Beijing to refrain from future testing.  For its part, China informed no one that it was test-firing offensive missiles into space, said nothing for days after it struck the satellite, and then issued what most observers regard as a hopelessly lame response: we conducted a test, threaten no one, and have nothing to hide.

Equally worrisome, Beijing’s handling of the event strongly suggests that its own foreign ministry was kept entirely in the dark about the ASAT tests.  In fact, it is very likely that, at most, only a very small number of leaders outside the military units charged with conducting the tests knew about them---possibly only Hu Jintao, China’s president and chairman of the leading organ responsible for military affairs.  It is even possible that Hu himself was not informed of each test. All nations seek to keep militarily sensitive actions under wraps.   But the Chinese too often take this practice to absurd lengths, giving the military excessive freedom and thus endangering their own security and that of others.  For many observers, in and out of China, this behavior reinforces the need for China to establish a strong national security council with a more effective interagency process that includes all top civilian and military leaders.

Finally, more broadly, neither Washington nor Beijing has given much indication that it understands and appreciates the concerns of the other side.  The US blithely ignores requests by other nations (including China) to discuss the militarization of space—or a treaty banning weaponization of that new arena—and for some reason seems to believe that all nations will accept the notion that US predominance there threatens no one.  In a similar fashion, in this instance, China destroyed a satellite with an offensive missile, thus directly challenging the US while casting doubt upon its oft-repeated commitment to global peace and development and the peaceful use of space; yet it acted as if it were testing a new automobile.  In this instance, the Chinese leadership’s inability to anticipate world reaction, or their indifference to it, is breathtaking.  It suggests that they are capable of dangerously misjudging the significance of other potentially provocative actions they might undertake.

All the above deficiencies in crisis management are among a number of problems that have been identified and analyzed by US and Chinese scholars and former officials as part of an unprecedented collaborative project led by the Carnegie Endowment and a Chinese research institute.   Although the two sides disagree on some of the conclusions reached, they do agree that, at a minimum, both countries should undertake a meaningful dialogue, as soon as possible, on the potential for seriously mismanaging future political-military crises.