Traditional and Non-traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific

IMGXYZ3773IMGZYXNaval expansion and increased commerce in the Asia-Pacific region has increased security tensions, particularly in the South China Sea. Recent ratcheting up of rhetoric between China and the Philippines highlight the complexity and intensity of maritime disputes. In the second annual workshop co-hosted by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) and the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, experts from China and the United States discussed traditional and non-traditional security trends confronting the Asia-Pacific region. Carnegie-Tsinghua’s Paul Haenle introduced the session and Lora Saalman and Wang Tao moderated.

Traditional Security: Maritime Claims

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was the first attempt by the United Nations to apply the concept of sovereignty to the maritime domain, explained one U.S. participant. The convention follows what he called the Westphalian tradition, which does not allow for historical claims of empires. He detailed the importance of UNCLOS to maritime security, particularly its provision of a legal framework for demarcating territorial sovereignty and adjudication of disputes over resources and waterways. As neither China nor the United States has acceded to UNCLOS, participants discussed how the two nations view maritime claims and disputes.

• U.S. and China: A Chinese scholar noted that while the United States urges China to adhere to UNCLOS, its own refusal to accede to the convention smacks of hypocrisy. A U.S. expert explained that while the U.S. Congress refuses to ratify UNCLOS, the United States has signed the 1994 Agreement for Implementation and the U.S. Navy obeys and enforces its provisions. The expert argued that China, by contrast, has its own alternative model for maritime law, under which it claims 200 nautical miles as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This claim provides China with sovereignty over the full territory’s natural resources and contravenes the UNCLOS provision of twelve nautical miles, argued this expert. China’s stance reduces its security and increases the likelihood of conflict escalation, he noted, since China is conducting military operations well away from its shoreline. He argued that China should clarify the parameters of its maritime model to reduce the chance of miscalculation. A Chinese expert disagreed, asserting that U.S. plans to position military forces far from its own shores in Australia have instead increased tensions in the region. He maintained that many scholars and government officials in China view this move as an attempt to contain a rising China.
   
• South China Sea: A Chinese participant noted that Track-1 and Track-2 dialogues since the 1990s have improved regional trust and understanding, but maritime issues continue to complicate Sino-U.S. regional relations. He emphasized that China has engaged in responsible behavior and self-restraint, contributing to a decline in tensions in the South China Sea since 2009. However, with the advent of official U.S. statements advocating a U.S. “pivot to Asia” in 2011, this all changed. Citing U.S. military sales to such countries as the Philippines, he argued that U.S. regional engagement has increased tensions and could lead to potential escalation and conflict. Another Chinese participant added that U.S. multinational military exercises in the region only increase nationalism within China. One of the U.S. participants responded that the South China Sea issue is only one small component of broader U.S.-China relations and has been largely manageable. One of the U.S. participants noted that the term “pivot” was a poor choice of wording to describe U.S. policy towards Asia, as it had never actually left and did not intend for this strategy to be confrontational. He added that this phraseology is more directed at a domestic U.S. audience than at an international one.
   
• U-Shaped Lines and Flexibility: One Chinese scholar claimed that territorial disputes are too sensitive to be resolved by international tribunals and favored resolution of such issues between the claimant nations. He argued that the “U-shaped line” that demarcates Chinese maritime claims has changed over time, indicating greater flexibility than is often assumed. Another participant noted that China’s Foreign Ministry has stated that no nation has historical claims to the entire South China Sea. Instead, he noted, China claims islands, not waters to gain jurisdiction. As such, the dashed maritime line to which many point on Chinese maps is to a much greater extent targeted at domestic consumption in China. While China envisions its claims as based on history, this is also true for Vietnam, the Philippines, among others, he maintained. This proliferation of claims is complicated by ambiguities on how to define islands and continental shelves that makes clarifying jurisdiction difficult, he added. A U.S. expert responded that the United States seeks stability and freedom of navigation in the region and, to this end, the identity of the country garnering territorial claims is not its primary concern.
   
• International Law: One U.S. expert argued that the centrality of international law has shrunk the policy options of the various players, forcing China to make selective legal claims to plug holes within the system. Nonetheless, he argued that internationally recognized legal mechanisms, such as the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, diminish ambiguities and enhance transparency, serving as baselines for adjudication. One of the Chinese scholars argued that the traditional and non-traditional value of the South China Sea in geo-economic and geo-strategic terms is increasing. Given that China has a lengthy coastline and countless islands, it continues to lack a maritime strategy and defense, he argued, making it vulnerable to attacks launched from sea. He added that China’s naval modernization is aimed at safeguarding its territory, under the overarching framework of international conventions. One of the U.S. experts suggested that this fact indicates the importance of China explicating its maritime model, intentions, and claims.

Non-traditional Security: Energy and Climate Change

• China and the United States: Both the United States and China are in agreement that more international and regional cooperation is needed to combat climate change, noted one U.S. expert. At the 2011 Climate Change Conference in Durban, a universal agreement was adopted that was largely based upon bilateral progress made at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. As the two largest energy consumers in the world, China and the United States account for 40 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, stated one U.S. expert. So while the global community has been cooperating to battle carbon emissions, in order for it to achieve this goal the United States and China must play a much greater role.

• Resources and Transportation: China is leading the way in its quest for alternative energy sources, with nuclear, wind, and solar among them, argued one Chinese expert. He contended that this is advantageous in increasing international cooperation and security. Oil politics and the struggle over natural resources have led to disputes in both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, responded one U.S. participant. A Chinese expert asked whether Indian dominance in the Indian Ocean region or more broadly in the Indo-Pacific would threaten China’s sea lines of communication essential for delivering energy and other supplies. An Indian participant answered that U.S. naval presence in the region makes such a scenario unlikely. Nonetheless, energy domination has been shifting to Asia, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea consuming more than 40 percent of oil supplies, he argued. This expert added that this is likely to lead to issues in shipping and securing waterways, making traditional security guarantees crucial components in ensuring non-traditional security needs.