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REQUIRED IMAGE
Source: Carnegie
For Immediate Release: January 28, 2003
Contact: Carmen MacDougall, 202-939-2319, cmacdougall@ceip.org
Western Rule-of-Law Aid Operates From "Disturbingly Thin Base of Knowledge" Concludes New Analysis
Western aid agencies prescribe rule-of-law programs to cure a remarkably wide array of ailments in developing and post-communist countries, from corruption and surging crime to lagging foreign investment and growth. Yet there is a surprising amount of uncertainty about their actual impact on these problems, as well as a lack of knowledge at many levels of conception, operation, and evaluation of the entire rule-of-law field.
In a new addition to Carnegie's working paper series on rule of law- "Promoting
Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge" -Thomas Carothers, director
of Carnegie's Democracy and Rule of Law Project, says the rapidly growing field
of rule-of-law assistance is operating from a disturbingly thin base of knowledge-with
respect to the core rationale of the work, how change in the rule of law occurs,
and the real effects of the changes that are produced.
Common wisdom suggests that rule of law promotion will contribute to economic
development and democratization, but Carothers notes the lack of evidence and
cites cases that counter the argument. He also notes the uncertainty about the
actual essence of the rule of law-whether it primarily resides in institutions
(e.g., courts or legislatures) or in societies' norms (how citizens use, understand,
and value the law). Rule-of-law promoters also do not really know how the rule
of law develops in societies and how its development can be stimulated beyond
simplistic efforts to copy Western legal institutions.
Another problem is that while aid providers do attempt some "lessons learned"
exercises, many of the lessons produced are superficial and even those are often
not really learned. Greater knowledge is needed, Carothers writes, despite a
number of obstacles, including the complexity of the task itself, the particularity
of legal systems, the unwillingness of aid organizations to sufficiently evaluate
programs, and the tendency of academics and lawyers not to pursue systematic
empirical research.
Thomas
Carothers
is a leading authority on democracy promotion and
democratization. His most recent book is Funding
Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, edited with Marina
S. Ottaway (Carnegie, 2000). He also wrote Aiding
Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve
(Carnegie, 1999).
The full text of this working paper can be downloaded at www.ceip.org/pubs.
Limited print copies are available by contacting pubs@ceip.org.
###
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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