As tensions grow and the prospect of a cross-strait understanding on Taiwan’s status seems increasingly remote, stability in the region depends more and more on military deterrence. Yet, Michael Swaine from the Carnegie Endowment argues in a new paper that there is real reason to worry about Taiwan’s ability to deter China. Though the United States and domestic reformers prodded Taiwan to begin modernizing its military several years ago, the island still spends relatively little on its own defense and has failed to significantly improve its capabilities in several areas. This, coupled with the Pentagon’s seemingly open-ended effort to assist the Taiwan military, could create the worst case scenario: an impression of a de facto U.S.-Taiwan defense alliance without sufficient improvement in Taiwan’s deterrence capability.

Deterring Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The Successes and Failures of Taiwan’s Defense Reform and Modernization Program, available at www.CarnegieEndowment.org/china, details Taiwan’s stated reform and modernization objectives, the steps taken so far, and their effectiveness. Swaine also discusses the underlying obstacles to reform, which he identifies as: lack of military and civilian support, service rivalries and institutional barriers, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, economic weakness, absence of mutually agreed national security and defense strategies, and a risk averse military culture. The decisions needed to overcome these weighty obstacles and achieve defense reform’s stated objectives could very likely be postponed or avoided for years.

Meanwhile, concerns about Taiwan’s inability to defend itself are exacerbated by a suspicion within the U.S. Defense Department that Beijing is placing top priority on acquiring the ability to launch a rapid decapitation strike against Taiwan before the United States could respond.

In Deterring Conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Swaine also addresses prospects for the future and implications for U.S. policy and the country’s relationship with China. Swaine argues that the United States must better coordinate the Pentagon’s robust attempts to strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities with the larger political and diplomatic objectives of the U.S.-China relationship. Swaine emphasizes that military capability alone will not maintain stability across the Taiwan Strait and, if mishandled, could even precipitate a conflict.

Note: A Mandarin translation of the paper will be available by August 1st.

Michael Swaine is a senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program specializing in Chinese security and foreign policy, U.S.–China relations, and East Asian international relations. One of the most prominent U.S. analysts in Chinese security studies, he is the author of more than 10 monographs on security policy in the region.