Turkey’s current instability is laden with geopolitical consequences. On the one hand, the rise of the protest movement highlights the yearning of the country’s educated urbanites—let’s call them Turkey I—for a more perfect democracy, their insistence on the secular character of the state, and a rejection of authoritarian style of governance. This activism suggests that the gap between Turkey and the European Union is narrowing, on the level of the advanced groups of society. If such reading of the Turkish developments is correct, then the Union needs to conclude that its soft power is working, and intensify its contacts with Ankara, drawing Turkey into ever tighter integration with, and eventually into the EU.

On the other hand, the protestors, while active and vocal, represent a minority of Turkey’s electorate. Prime Minister Erdogan’s Justice and Development (AK) party has won three elections in a row, plus a constitutional referendum. The current protests notwithstanding, Turkey’s silent majority—let’s say, Turkey II—is with Erdogan. This is a clear result of his policy of economic reform, which spurred the country’s economic growth, empowered private businessmen, and raised the purchasing power of the entire population. Pro-business as he is, Erdogan, however, is also an Islamist leader who dreams of Turkey as a regional power. Both Islamist identity and regional ambitions distinguish today’s Turkey.