One reason is that Russia has no understanding of “soft power.” Since October 2012, the new Georgian government has indicated its willingness to be present at the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games; it has made steps to revitalize trade relations. Clearly, however, most Georgians do not find the Eurasian Union or the Collective Security Treaty Organization membership appealing. These “options” appear to be multilateral facets of a Russian lebensraum policy.

Engagement as such is not in vain. As of recent, the Russian prime minister indicated that the “borderization” of secessionist entities was not Kremlin policy. Ultimately, this is a realistic approach. In 2008, President Saakashvili misguidedly tried to counterbalance strategic asymmetry with tactical maneuvering, playing into a Russian trap. However, Georgia’s loss is not straightforwardly Russia’s gain. Moscow is held hostage to vested interests in Russia and client regimes it needs to support with cash and fuel subsidies; in kick-starting nation-building projects in the region, the Kremlin has to deal with domino effects in the North Caucasus. Bottom line: Moscow, unlike Brussels, does not have a “Neighborhood Policy.”

This is in fact bad geopolitics: no war can be won without a “peace theory.” Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory is uncontested, quite decoupled from either “sticks” or “carrots.” It provides the polity with a sense of direction and intervals of achievement, the promise of higher human rights standards and opportunity for upward social mobility. “Returning to Europe” is meaningful. The Russian option is but a threat—a threat to our independence, sovereignty, and the capacity-building to become a normal, relevant, and democratic state. At least these are the perceptions on Georgian minds. While anyone with a sense of realism admits that a modus vivendi must be found, being intimidated into a choice hardly constitutes an “alternative trajectory.”

Tedo Japaridze is chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Parliament of Georgia.