Since February 2022, war is back on the European continent because of the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which continues to engage in hostile actions against Western European infrastructure. Since January 20 this year, U.S. President Donald Trump has taken on positions that challenge the transatlantic relationship in multiple fields: climate change, trade, financial contributions to NATO, a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, and territorial claims. In addition, certain U.S.-based individuals have interfered directly in Germany’s upcoming election and in UK politics while openly challenging EU rules on digital services.
In many ways, Russia’s aggressive policies and the U.S. administration’s unprecedented attitude are combining to alter the pillars of international relations. Europe finds itself at a watershed moment in its modern history, facing both a disruptive autocracy in Russia and an ally-turned-bully in the United States. European leaders must urgently confront this new collection of challenges in a firm and resolute way. A values-based coalition of willing Western European governments would send a powerful signal to friends and foes alike.
The Immediate Priority: Ukraine’s Future
Today, the pressing issue for European leaders is Ukraine’s future. The immediate risk is that a bilateral dialogue takes place between Washington and Moscow without proper consultations in NATO, with the EU, and with Ukraine itself. Such a situation is not acceptable because it would upend NATO’s entire political architecture.
Yet, Trump’s proclivity toward a personal dialogue with Vladimir Putin will likely be accepted by the Russian president and may well leave Western European leaders out of the loop. EU heads of state and government should pay utmost attention to this risk, since Washington is clearly no longer thinking about the EU but now prefers bilateral dialogues with European leaders of its choosing.
If a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire were to include an international presence in Ukraine, Washington might call for a coalition of European separation forces, with no role for U.S. troops. Russia is likely to oppose the presence of Western European forces, but there is no easy alternative.
Irrespective of any ceasefire, military and economic support to Ukraine from the United States, the UK, EU members of NATO, and Turkey should continue and increase. Maintaining Ukraine’s sovereignty, even if accompanied by the temporary occupation of some of the country’s land, will be crucial in avoiding a protracted war on Ukrainian soil and in protecting the EU’s Eastern flank. In this respect, ramping up Europe’s defense-industrial capabilities will be critical, as illustrated by the informal retreat of EU leaders called by the European Council president on February 3, with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer participating.
Understanding Trump’s Policy Direction
The U.S. approach to Ukraine is by no means the sole aspect of Trump’s foreign policy that European leaders need to gauge. Europe began scrutinizing the then president-elect’s messages on November 5, 2024, but policy statements have proliferated since his January 20 inaugural address. Analysis is ongoing.
Trump’s unpredictable statements tend to vary over time as electoral promises meet realities. If the White House launches a trade war against the EU, there will be retaliations and therefore gains and losses. If the United States scales down its economic and military assistance to Ukraine to shift the burden onto European countries, the U.S. defense industry will lose massive financial returns. A land grab policy may be an attractive narrative until the Trump administration dives into its legal and political consequences.
Aggressive U.S. policies may also evolve if and when the EU decides to use its legislative toolbox. The bloc has several policies—for example, its trade policy instruments or the Digital Services Act—that apply to all EU member states and to third countries. The option of bilateral deals between the United States and individual EU members does not exist where common policies are in place. Such bilateral agreements must not be tolerated, although some EU governments may argue in favor of them. Similarly, EU solidarity will be tested if Trump’s disruptive proposals on Greenland and Denmark materialize.
The above range of issues shows how important a constant dialogue with the second Trump administration is. It also underlines how crucial the cohesion of the EU’s policymaking mechanisms will be and, by extension, how vital a dialogue is between EU and non-EU European leaders. This test of resilience is essential during the first one hundred days of Trump’s second presidency.
Reinforcing European Policy Cohesion
The EU’s cohesion will likely be tested twice in the short and medium term.
First, Russia will continue to exert pressure on like-minded European leaders in office—the prime ministers of Hungary and Slovakia—and on political parties in other countries to block EU actions on Ukraine and Moldova, and to minimize or slow EU reactions to Russia’s hybrid attacks on European infrastructure.
Second, in facing the Trump administration, the EU and other European countries will need to set up genuine redlines in several fields, including political interference in European countries’ domestic politics, land grabs of foreign countries and territories, the imposition of tariffs, and attacks on the regulation of digital services.
The obvious risk in advocating redlines is that EU leaders find themselves divided even before being actively divided by Washington and Moscow.
Yet, redlines are a political necessity that applies first to the EU institutions and the union’s twenty-seven national governments. It also applies to other European partners: The UK is of crucial importance, while other governments—those of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, the countries of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkey—may also be directly concerned.
Achieving cohesion requires a thorough consultation process within the European Council, presided over since December 2024 by António Costa, whose major task is precisely to “facilitate cohesion and consensus.” It also requires intensified consultation with the UK and NATO. This is easier said than done, given the propensity of European Council members to express themselves in a disorderly manner and the poor record of coordination among EU institutions during the previous legislature, which ended in November 2024. A recent example is the January 21 claim by Hungary’s prime minister that Trump’s election will transform the entire world and boost his own “Occupy Brussels” campaign.
The Future Political Organization of Wider Europe
Over the long term, maintaining peace in Europe will very much depend on broader negotiations toward an effective security architecture for the continent. This may take years to achieve.
In the short term, the danger is that a Putin-Trump ceasefire dialogue may last several months, if not longer. This situation would expose a major vacuum for the leaders of wider Europe: There is currently no actionable forum for political and security discussions between Ukraine and Moldova, on the one hand, and Western European leaders, on the other. Forums such as the EU, the Council of Europe, and NATO do not have such a mandate, while the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is disqualified because of Russia’s presence. In addition, enlargement of the EU and NATO to Ukraine and Moldova is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
Other active groupings, such as the Nordic-Baltic 8++ and the Weimar Triangle, have limited memberships, while the European Political Community (EPC), created in 2022, does not currently have the necessary features: principles on which members have formally agreed, a permanent structure, conclusions, and follow-up to the forum’s discussions. Yet, most Western European powers will need to nurture such a dialogue if a wider war is to be avoided in the future. One of these three frameworks could provide a way forward.
As a theoretical—and highly idealistic—example, progress could be achieved by transforming the EPC through a coalition of the willing. This would require a concrete proposal by a cluster of the community’s current members, say France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, and the UK, to the others. Willing countries would be invited to commit on a voluntary basis to three components.
The first would be a formal pledge to abide by the goals and principles of the UN Charter; to live in peace with all European peoples and governments; to protect the liberty, common heritage, and civilization of all Europeans; and to abide by the principles of democracy, individual liberties, and rule of law. (This commitment is modeled on the preamble of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which is accepted by all NATO members.)
The second component would be a formal mechanism for political consultations, supported by a small and permanent diplomatic secretariat tasked with convening meetings, publishing conclusions, and implementing concrete actions.
The third element would be a commitment to work collectively on peace and security by accelerating European defense-industrial cooperation through the appropriate channels.
These three components together would form the basis of the coalition of the willing and should not be separated from one another.
The message carried by such a political initiative would be powerful. To Russia, it would convey Europe’s desire to live in peace and its determination to resist aggression. To the United States, it would signal Europe’s willingness to assume a bigger share of its own security and live by its own rules. To the Global South, it would illustrate that Europe is a force based on peace, stability, and principles. And to the populations of Western Europe, it would represent a reassuring message of peaceful resolve.
Undoubtedly, emboldening Europe to confront current challenges is an immense task, and the risk of failure is equally big. Yet, the seventy-seven years during which Western Europe suffered no major war on its soil represented a charmed parenthesis. This parenthesis is now closed.
