The Bush administration may soon abandon programs to eliminate excess plutonium from nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia. In 1994, the National Academy of Sciences stated that the massive stocks of excess plutonium in both countries were a "clear and present danger." Failure to follow through now on efforts to dispose of this material would be an abdication of the national and international responsibility to safeguard future generations from the nuclear legacy of the Cold War. Instead of reversing course on this important program, the administration should move to improve and accelerate current efforts. The administration appears ready to spend more in one year ($8 billion) to try and defend against a North Korea missile that does not yet exist than it is willing to spend over 20 years to eliminate thousands of weapons worth of plutonium in Russia and the United States.
According to reports, the administration is considering killing ongoing efforts to dispose of 68 tons of this weapon-usable material - enough to produce over 17,000 nuclear weapons - and instead study possible options for its elimination. Years of study and tens of thousands of man-hours have already been expended by the top scientific minds to develop the current program. Viable options for disposal of this material have been identified for over a decade and include: mixing plutonium with radioactive waste for disposal (immobilization), irradiation of plutonium in current or future reactors, or deep geological disposal. The option of direct geologic disposal was discarded because of environmental and security concerns, and the decision was made not to wait on development of new reactors because the delay in implementation was considered unacceptable.
The Bush administration's reported concerns with the current plutonium disposition program are based on the project's costs and projected timeline for implementation. It is ironic, therefore, that the administration appears to be favoring the development of new reactors for the disposal of plutonium. The NAS rejected the idea of delaying disposition until new reactors for disposal could be developed, citing the unacceptable delay involved.
The administration has yet to express its support for the Clinton administration's decision to declare 50 tons of defense-origin plutonium "excess" to defense needs and prohibit the materials future use in nuclear weapons. Reversal of direction on plutonium disposition should set off alarm bells, given statements by administration officials regarding the need to maintain the ability to rebuild the size of U.S. nuclear forces if international circumstances change. The disposition of excess plutonium has two main security benefits: preventing the theft of weapons material by other groups or countries and helping establish the irreversibility of the arms reduction process. Any decision to delay current efforts to dispose of excess plutonium without an alternative path forward would be a serious setback for both goals. Moreover, it would be a serious blow to U.S. credibility with Russia and cast further suspicion on the Bush administration's commitment to non-proliferation efforts.