The Bush-Putin arms control roller-coaster took another turn for the worse last Thursday when President Bush stated in no uncertain terms that he will continue to press his Russian counterpart on the need to scrap the 1972 ABM Treaty. Emboldened by both the Russian support for the war on terrorism and the wartime groundswell of public support for his foreign policy agenda at home, the President is trying to seize the moment and kill the proverbial two birds with one stone. In one fell swoop, the Administration hopes not only to implement its 'new strategic relationship' with Russia sans the ABM Treaty, but also speed development and deployment of its missile defense program at home. Such a move, however, makes achieving the Administration's near term goal of deploying a missile defense with Russia's blessing harder, and could result in long-term damage to the U.S.- Russian relationship.
Certainly, the blossoming spirit of cooperation emerging between the Cold War rivals should be lauded and encouraged by the Bush administration. Developments in the past few weeks have been significant and promising. Russia is supporting the war on terrorism, has looked the other way at America's use of military bases in its Central Asian neighbors and has softened opposition to NATO expansion. Some stated that in this crafting this series of moves, Putin has redefined Russia's relationship not only with the U.S., but with the entire world. Such moves are not without significant risk. In sidling closer to the West, Putin acted against not only the wishes of a significant share of his nationalist-minded electorate, but more importantly against the wishes of many close advisors and top forces in the military. As a result Putin and his advisors will be looking for a way to demarcate Russian foreign policy interests independent of the United States. A full-bore press by the Bush administration on missile defense will provide exactly such an opporunity. Putin will likely stand firmly against the U.S. on this sensitive issue, mollify a wary Russian populace, and calm the fears of his advisors. And the Bush administration will be no closer to Russian acquiesence on missile defense than it was before Putin's bold moves - in fact it will have forced Putin into using opposition on this issue for domestic gain at a time in which an inducement-driven strategy might yield different results.
In the long run, pressing the issue of missile defense so quickly could jeopardize the very type of relationship the administration seeks to build with Russia. Indeed, Russian obstinacy to the elimination of the ABM Treaty could extend to other areas of cooperation. With the strategic review of U.S. nuclear forces due sometime in November, the U.S. could suddenly find Russia less willing to follow further U.S. reductions in its nuclear arsenal. Other threat reductions already under strain such as the plutonium disposition program and Nunn-Lugar programs could also find a less willing Russian partner. Perhaps even more disastrous in the near term, Russia could begin to tire of the U.S. presence in central Asia - intelligence sharing and cooperation in the war on terrorism could be reduced.
It is inevitable that the topic of missile defense and the ABM Treaty will re-emerge in the U.S.-Russian relationship. The re-emergence of the Treaty, however, need not necessitate an immediate rollback or halt of the current cooperative spirit between the two countries. Nevertheless, by choosing to make the termination of the ABM Treaty such a clear and prominent goal so soon into this new and still undefined honeymoon period, the Bush administration may be creating a more difficult situation not only its immediate goals, but for the very relationship that it has worked to foster.
For related news and analysis please see
"Bush to Press Putin on Scrapping ABM" Moscow Times, 15 October 2001.
"Tying Russia to West, Putin Unveils Strategy But Risks Backlash" New York Times, 9 October 2001.
"Terror Attacks and Hope for the U.S-Russian Relationship" Jon Wolfsthal, Carnegie Analysis, 1 October 2001.