Commentary
Dmitri Trenin
{
"authors": [
"Dmitri Trenin"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [],
"projects": [
"Eurasia in Transition"
],
"regions": [
"Central Asia",
"Caucasus",
"Russia",
"Eastern Europe",
"Ukraine"
],
"topics": [
"Political Reform",
"Security",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}
REQUIRED IMAGE
In The Media
Russia's Spheres of Interest, not Influence
Russia retains interests throughout the post-Soviet regions, but Moscow’s considerable influence is no longer dominant.
Published on Sep 22, 2009
Source: The Washington Quarterly
In the aftermath of the 2008 Georgian war, President Dmitri Medvedev, setting out Russia’s foreign policy principles, spoke about the country’s spheres of “privileged interests” and the government’s obligation to defend Russian citizens abroad. Coming less than a month after Russia’s armed response to Georgia’s attack on its breakaway province of South Ossetia, where most residents had been provided with Russian passports, this statement produced a shock. It sounded as if Moscow was reclaiming the Soviet geopolitical legacy of Russia’s spheres of influence and was prepared to intervene with force in countries with significant ethnic Russian minorities. The talk of Russian assertiveness, making rounds since the mid-2000s, was substantially enhanced by accusations of Russia’s outright aggressive behavior. The year that followed has seen an unprecedented global financial and economic crisis, a new administration in Washington, and a decrease in tensions between Russia and the United States. The issues that had produced a near confrontation between the two—such as the United States’ single-minded support for President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia; Russia’s actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; NATO’s membership action plans (MAPs) to Georgia and Ukraine; and plans to install U.S. ballistic missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland—while not completely off the table, are now clearly on the backburner.
Toward the end of 2008, however, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in a wide-ranging statement, made a very strong case for the “unique relations” that bound Russia and the countries of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He spoke about “civilizational unity” of the lands that used to be the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and before that, the Russian empire. Thus, a question arose: what is the difference, if any, between the sphere of interests proclaimed by the current Russian leadership, and the more traditional sphere of influence condemned by international public opinion? What, after all, are Moscow’s motives and its aims?
About the Author
Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.
- Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space
- What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West RevealedCommentary
Dmitri Trenin
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Europe
- Russia’s Imperial Retreat Is Europe’s Strategic OpportunityCommentary
The war in Ukraine is costing Russia its leverage overseas. Across the South Caucasus and Middle East, this presents an opportunity for Europe to pick up the pieces and claim its own sphere of influence.
William Dixon, Maksym Beznosiuk
- Is the Radical-Right Threat Existential or Overstated?Commentary
Amid increased polarization and the influence of disinformation, radical-right parties are once again gaining traction across Europe. With landmark elections on the horizon in several countries, are the EU’s geostrategic vision and fundamental values under existential threat?
Catherine Fieschi, Cas Mudde
- Europe and the Arab Gulf Must Come TogetherCommentary
The war in Iran proves the United States is now a destabilizing actor for Europe and the Arab Gulf. From protect their economies and energy supplies to safeguarding their territorial integrity, both regions have much to gain from forming a new kind of partnership together.
Rym Momtaz
- Taking the Pulse: Is France’s New Nuclear Doctrine Ambitious Enough?Commentary
French President Emmanuel Macron has unveiled his country’s new nuclear doctrine. Are the changes he has made enough to reassure France’s European partners in the current geopolitical context?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- The Iran War’s Dangerous Fallout for EuropeCommentary
The drone strike on the British air base in Akrotiri brings Europe’s proximity to the conflict in Iran into sharp relief. In the fog of war, old tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean risk being reignited, and regional stakeholders must avoid escalation.
Marc Pierini
