• Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Europe logoCarnegie lettermark logo
EUUkraine
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Dmitri Trenin"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "United States",
    "Russia",
    "Eastern Europe",
    "Ukraine"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Commentary
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

21st Century Great Game as a New Normal

The 25-year-long quest for Russia's integration with the West is off. A new normalcy is setting between Russia and the West resembles the Russo-British Great Game of the 19th century—this time between America and Russia.

Link Copied
By Dmitri Trenin
Published on Jun 30, 2014

In my discussions about Russia and the West in London last week, a sense of the end of an  era was palpable. The 25-year-long quest for Russia's integration with the West is off, at least for the foreseeable future, everyone agreed. Russia is pivoting to itself, to its partners in Eurasia, and to Asia. Ukraine symbolizes the new period of intense rivalry between Russia and the West.

Interestingly, this conclusion is accompanied by some regret, but not too much alarm. While "Mr. Putin's motives and strategies" are often believed to be a mystery, there is no fear of an impending armed conflict involving Russia and the West. Ukraine is seen as  remaining unstable for some time. Vladimir Putin has certainly won no friends in Western Europe, but a new cold war is not believed to be on the cards unless Russia goes on to destabilize the Baltics, which everyone, except the Balts themselves, thinks is a very long shot.

There is a general rejection of the Russian moves in Crimea and Ukraine. The official position is amplified by the media and its pundits, but despite the uniformity of condemnation, it rarely reaches the emotional peak. The U.S.-UK experience in Iraq is not forgotten, and too much self-righteousness is not appreciated.

Appetite for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova drawing closer to the EU is very light. The disappointment which followed the 2004 Orange revolution has made people more cautious. There is particularly little willingness to foot Ukraine's bills. And there is absolutely no support for Ukraine's NATO membership. The business community is concerned about the effect of the sanctions, but it also tends to be pragmatic. It is now time to buy, while the Russian stock is low.

Russia and Ukraine no longer dominate the foreign policy debate. Other issues have come to the fore, such as the rise of extremists in Iraq and Syria, and most recently Britain's relations with the European Union. This does not suggest that things will get back to where they were between Russia and the West, but rather that a new normalcy is setting in, which will probably resemble the Russo-British Great Game of the 19th century—this time between America and Russia, and under conditions of globalization—than the 20th century Cold War between communism and capitalism.

About the Author

Dmitri Trenin

Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space

      Dmitri Trenin

  • Commentary
    What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West Revealed

      Dmitri Trenin

Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Foreign PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesRussiaEastern EuropeUkraine

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Europe

  • Europe far right MAGA Trump
    Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Why MAGA’s Far-Right European Ties Will Endure

    In supporting Europe’s far-right, MAGA and Russia both want the same thing: a weaker EU. Europe must defend itself without abandoning the openness these forces exploit.

      • Armida van rij

      Armida van Rij

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Letter from the Editor: Europe Takes Two Steps Forward But One Step Back

    As we close out another season of Strategic Europe, it is worth taking stock of the deep shifts underway.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Paper
    Assessing Information Ecosystems: How Governments Can Get Ahead of Hybrid Threats

    The hybrid warfare landscape is evolving rapidly, leaving policymakers without clear strategies. To better inform their work in addressing emerging challenges, governments must dig deeper into the underlying dynamics at play.

      Raluca Csernatoni, Alicia Wanless

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Are the EU’s Watered-Down Russia Sanctions Better than None?

    The EU had to compromise to adopt a twenty-first sanctions package against Russia, exposing growing cracks in the union’s resolve. Is this latest, weaker round worth it to keep pressure on Moscow?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Why Europe Must Take Charge of its Russia Diplomacy Now

    Trump is distracted and Ukraine wants Europe to step up. The continent’s leaders must find their voice and assert it in talks with Russia.

      Alissa de Carbonnel

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
Carnegie Europe logo, white
Rue du Congrès, 151000 Brussels, Belgium
  • Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Gender Equality Plan
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.