Commentary
Dmitri Trenin
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Source: Getty
Commentary
Shevardnadze’s Place in Russian History
President Shevardnadze belongs to the people of Georgia. At the same time, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will forever remain a major figure in Russia’s history, because he helped wind down the Cold War.
Published on Jul 8, 2014
President Eduard Shevardnadze belongs to the people of Georgia. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will forever remain a major figure in Russia’s history. A controversial figure, no doubt, but one that certainly commands respect. In the powerful duo with Mikhail Gorbachev, and in partnership with U.S. and other western leaders, Shevardnadze helped wind down the Cold War. Thus, they did a great service to humanity as a whole, and to those living in the former Soviet Union. We need not ignore the simple fact that among the alternatives to the Cold War there was not only the peace order that some have later come to detest, but a real war directly involving the United States and the Soviet Union. That now, despite the very real U.S.-Russian confrontation over Ukraine, there is no talk—and no likelihood—of a nuclear exchange between Moscow and Washington is also to Shevardnadze’s credit.
Shevardnadze’s and Gorbachev’s true weakness on the international stage was not their presumed malleability or naiveté vis-à-vis their U.S. and West European counterparts. A foreign policy strategist or a top diplomat can usually be as successful as the strength of the country he leads and serves would allow. If incompetent, he can punch under one’s weight, or make costly, even disastrous mistakes, sapping his own power. One can also seek to punch above one’s weight, of course, but only in extraordinary circumstances and for brief periods of time. The Soviet Union, which Gorbachev led, and Shevardnadze represented to the world, had been rotten economically, politically and ideologically long before they ascended to their posts. Again, there is no need to forget that Gorbachev’s détente and disarmament were dictated primarily by the growing lack of resources even for modest domestic development.
This does not mean that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze made no mistakes. Like Gorbachev, he was overly enthusiastic about their “new thinking,” and overly optimistic about the future of relations with the West. The end of the Cold War must have seemed to him the end of history, which of course it was not. The binary construct of the era of confrontation—friend or foe—demanded turning foes into friends, a conversion which proved far from fully satisfactory. “Universal interests of humankind” were not given a proper place among the various echelons of Moscow’s foreign policy, but instead appeared to overshadow the country’s specific national interests. Against that background, the charges that are usually brought against Shevardnadze by his critics, from banning the Oka missile to the Bering Sea settlement, should be seriously discussed by foreign policy historians. Luckily, they have so much more access to the papers of the Gorbachev presidency than of the periods that have followed.
About the Author
Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.
- Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space
- What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West RevealedCommentary
Dmitri Trenin
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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