Maksim Samorukov is a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
Samorukov’s research is focused on Russia’s relations with the states of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe. From 2015-2022 he was a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center based in Russia, until the center was closed down by the Russian authorities.
Before joining Carnegie in 2015, Samorukov worked at independent Russian media outlets including Slon.ru as an international correspondent and columnist, covering topics including Russian foreign policy and its ties with Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Balkans.
Before joining Slon.ru, Samorukov worked at Insider magazine, covering the Eastern European insurance markets.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has left a group of “in-between” European countries more vulnerable and insecure than ever before. This arc of instability spans from the South Caucasus through Moldova to the Western Balkans.
Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, and Serbia are caught in between Russia and the EU, building ties with the latter even as the former seeks to maintain influence there and deter the West.
Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday will be inaugurated to another six-year term. Most European Union countries are boycotting the ceremony.
Like the Soviet one that preceded it, his system is always on the brink of collapse.
By solving a Russian domestic crisis, the Belarusian leader has effectively joined the ranks of Russian grandees vying for Putin’s favor by eliminating irritating problems that could distract the president from his high-stakes geopolitical machinations.
Regardless of how worn-out Russians may be, therefore, Putin will stick to his selective perception of reality, looking for reasons for and ways to further escalate his addictive crusade against the current world order.
Without the assistance of local actors, Russian influence in the Western Balkans would disappear overnight. But the opposite is also true. As long as local politicians can capitalize on invoking Moscow’s long shadow, Russia will remain a salient part of the Balkan landscape.
Given how thoroughly Ukraine has overshadowed all other Russian foreign policy objectives, it seems unlikely that Moscow would embark on another risky undertaking with unclear prospects in the Western Balkans.
The scandal has helped both countries to gain the kind of publicity they strived for without damaging their relationship.
A recent poll showed that 46 percent of Serbs believe that their country should stay neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war, confirming that a balancing act appears to be the least costly strategy for the Serbian government.
