• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Benjamin Silverstein"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "Carnegie Space Project"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "TIA",
  "programs": [
    "Technology and International Affairs"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Iran"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Technology"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Commentary

How Governments Should Address the Increasing Risks of Satellite Collision

Riskier launch operations may hasten the danger of orbital debris.

Link Copied
By Benjamin Silverstein
Published on Apr 11, 2022
Program mobile hero image

Program

Technology and International Affairs

The Technology and International Affairs Program develops insights to address the governance challenges and large-scale risks of new technologies. Our experts identify actionable best practices and incentives for industry and government leaders on artificial intelligence, cyber threats, cloud security, countering influence operations, reducing the risk of biotechnologies, and ensuring global digital inclusion.

Learn More

Growing interest in networks of thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO)—often called megaconstellations—has elevated concerns about the sustainability of human activities in outer space. State and private actors alike are interested in deploying megaconstellations in pursuit of advantages in commerce and interstate competition, despite the attendant risks of orbital overcrowding and collisions between spacecraft. In response, states should collaboratively enhance multinational space traffic coordination to reduce the chances of collision and curb the spread of debris in orbit.

Plummeting costs of manufacturing and launching satellites into orbit have prompted companies and governments to reconsider previously cost-prohibitive satellite network designs that provide global coverage. Moreover, faster mass production practices and more accessible launch services enable operators to replace broken satellites more rapidly. The financial risks of mission failure have declined, leading to riskier operations that may hasten the proliferation of orbital debris from failed or failing satellites.

Thus far, governments have been slow to adapt regulatory oversight practices to address risks specific to megaconstellations, let alone override deployments. Yet major government stakeholders are beginning to voice concerns about the risks stemming from tens of thousands of new satellites in LEO. Within the U.S. government, NASA recently expressed concerns about SpaceX’s plans for its Starlink megaconstellation. In a letter to the Federal Communications Commission, which has regulatory responsibility for commercial satellite launches, NASA outlined how more megaconstellations could significantly hamper access to Earth’s orbits and constrain space activities.

NASA’s letter is a notable indicator of shifting perceptions of the risks of megaconstellations. NASA and SpaceX signed a ten-year commitment in 2021 to coordinate collision avoidance maneuvering. Under this agreement, SpaceX took the onus for moving satellites in its Starlink megaconstellation out of NASA’s way to preclude instances in which both operators attempt to avoid a collision between their satellites and accidentally maneuver into one another. Just over a year into the agreement, it appears that NASA considers this type of ad hoc arrangement insufficient for supporting space safety.

Several nongovernmental observers share NASA’s concerns that current space governance mechanisms cannot manage risks related to megaconstellations. It is unlikely that the sources of risks in LEO will abate in the imminent future. More megaconstellation deployments, operated by actors from multiple countries with various motivations, necessitate better space traffic coordination. An orbital traffic management system capable of handling new megaconstellations will require states to hold both their domestic industry and each other accountable for collecting, sharing, and analyzing data on satellites in LEO.

Currently, most of the world relies on the U.S. Department of Defense to collect and analyze data on objects in LEO. The 18th Space Control Squadron alerts the owners of spacecraft when analyses indicate potential conjunctions. These warnings are often rendered meaningless by significant margins of error, blurring expectations about risk-reducing behaviors. Even when analyses precisely uncover an imminent conjunction, there is no threshold collision probability that absolutely warrants an avoidance maneuver, nor globally accepted rules for how, where, and when to move.

To address the looming spike in imprecise conjunction warnings stimulated by a boom in megaconstellations, states should share relevant data about satellites in addition to orbital elements. States can build on existing measures such as the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, agreed to by members of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, to foster cooperation on a centralized mechanism for data collection and conjunction analyses. Building on this foundation, states can establish and enforce rules about collision avoidance maneuvers. This would engender trust and transparency among state and commercial satellite operators alike.

The international community has arranged rules for terrestrial, maritime, and aeronautical collision avoidance. It is high time to establish similar rules for Earth’s orbits.

About the Author

Benjamin Silverstein

Former Research Analyst, Space Project

Benjamin Silverstein was a research analyst for the Space Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Benjamin Silverstein
Former Research Analyst, Space Project
TechnologyIran

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • Lee and Lula walking
    Commentary
    Emissary
    Why Korea’s President Skipped Washington for Silicon Valley and Brasília

    Lee’s tour shows how Seoul is reorganizing its diplomacy away from Pyongyang and toward industrial networks and the geography of the compute economy.

      Darcie Draudt-Véjares

  • An AS3 interceptor part of the Merops, an AI-powered anti-drone system is pictured during a NATO live-fire demonstration of a counter-UAS system on November 18, 2025 in Nowa Deba, Poland.
    Paper
    Confronting the Barriers to AI Diffusion in the U.S. Military

    The Pentagon is calling for a rapid AI transformation. Autonomous drones offer a case study in the eight bottlenecks the U.S. military must navigate to realize that vision.

      Jake Steckler

  • Port cranes at sunset
    Commentary
    Emissary
    The Drone Attack on Egypt and the Widening Middle East War

    The targeting of Damietta Port appears to be more than a mere security message.

      Amr Hamzawy

  • An aerial drone photo taken on June 4, 2026 shows a wind-photovoltaic power storage station of Huadian Inner Mongolia New Energy Co., Ltd. as part of the Horinger data center cluster green energy supply demonstration project, in Hohhot, north China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
    Commentary
    Are Data Centers the Solution to China’s Renewables Excess Capacity?

    China’s latest energy plan explicitly calls for integrating data centers into the electricity system, particularly connecting them to green energy. It appears Beijing wants to use compute as a source of domestic demand to absorb renewables excess capacity.

      • Damien Ma

      Damien Ma

  • Article
    Build, Not Buy: The Semiconductor Lesson that Indian AI Experts Must Learn

    As AI grows more sophisticated, as the supply chains that power it become more contested, and as access to frontier models becomes geopolitically charged, India must begin to ask a different set of questions. Not what applications it can build on someone else’s infrastructure but what the world needs.

      Konark Bhandari

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.