REQUIRED IMAGE
The news that Iran is building a uranium enrichment facility has increased previously existing concerns over Iran's nuclear intentions. Information about the full extent of Iran's current and future capabilities is not known, but enough information has been publicly discussed to provide some background.
Natanz
The Natanz facility is located in central Iran, approximately 200 miles
south of Tehran. The complex itself is extensive and covers nearly 100,000 square
meters. Many of the largest structures within the complex are buried underground.
The two largest of these structures enclose about 60,000 square meters collectively.
1
The full facility is still under construction and is not scheduled for completion until 2005. According to administration and IAEA officials, there are currently 160 centrifuge machines at the facility that are considered operational and parts are in place for another 1000 machines. Iran denies that any uranium has been run through these units, but experts believe Iran would be unlikely to move forward with serial production of centrifuges that had not been tested with uranium. A recent Time magazine article also reports that the IAEA found that Iran had added uranium to the centrifuges to test the machines.2 When completed, the Natanz facility is expected to house 5,000 gas centrifuges and could produce enough material for two weapons a year.3
There has been much speculation about Iran's decision to place the most sensitive sites underground. In a press briefing in December, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said, ""It appears from the imagery that a service road, several small structures, and perhaps three large structures are being built below grade, and some of these are already being covered with earth. Iran clearly intended to harden and bury that facility. That facility was probably never intended by Iran to be a declared component of the peaceful program. Instead, Iran has been caught constructing a secret underground site where it could produce fissile material."
Construction on the Natanz facility is believed to have begun in 2000.4 However, Iran's ambitions to develop an indigenous uranium enrichment program date back more than a decade. According to western intelligence sources, in the early '90s Iran repeatedly attempted to purchase balancing machines and diagnostic and monitoring equipment from various European countries.5
Where Did The Technology Come From?
It is still unclear exactly where Iran obtained the designs and materials to
manufacture the centrifuges at the Natanz site. There is speculation amongst
U.S. officials that the original design came from Pakistan and was adapted by
the Iranians. According to a report in the Washington Post, Iran was
able to overcome engineering obstacles with the assistance of foreign scientists.
6 Iranian officials have stated that their reluctance
to disclose the existence of the facility was due in part to their concern that
the U.S. would pressure foreign suppliers to stop aiding the project. This comment
appears to confirm that outside assistance for the facility was used.
Violation of the NPT?
Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 1, 1968, and maintains
it remains a member in good standing. Tehran, however, has not signed the IAEA's
93 + 2 protocol, which allows the agency to inspect all nuclear activities,
including those that are undeclared by member states. Under the original safeguards
agreement, Iran is not obligated to declare the Natanz enrichment plant until
180 days before the facility is supplied with nuclear material. If Iranian claims
are true and no nuclear material has been run through machines at this facility,
failure to immediately disclose the facility is not a violation of Iran's NPT
commitments. During Mohamed ElBaradei's visit to Iran in February, Iranian officials
agreed to provide design information on the Natanz facility to the IAEA this
spring.7
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News
Notes:
1 "Detailed Assessment of the Possible Uranium Enrichment
Plant at Natanz, Iran," ISIS Issue Brief by
David Albright, February 20, 2003
2 "Iran's Nuclear Threat," Time, March 13, 2003
3 "Iran's Nuclear Program Speeds Ahead," Washington Post, March 10,
2003
4 Natanz Fact Sheet by John Pike, Global Security.org
5 Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destrcution
6 "Iran's Nuclear Program Speeds Ahead," Washington Post, March 10,
2003
7 "Furor over Fuel," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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