Commentary
Dmitri Trenin
{
"authors": [
"Dmitri Trenin"
],
"type": "commentary",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Russia",
"Eastern Europe",
"Ukraine",
"Western Europe"
],
"topics": [
"Security",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Commentary
Will Ukraine Bring Finland Into NATO?
The current situation in Ukraine has intensified the long-simmering debate in Finland about joining NATO.
Published on Apr 22, 2014
Any possible compromise in and on Ukraine would leave the country a neutral territory between Russia to the east and NATO to the west. Speaking at the 50th Munich Security Conference last February—it seems like a different epoch now—Zbigniew Brzezinski even spoke about “Finlandization” of Ukraine. A long time ago, my Finnish friends strongly discouraged me from ever using the term, which they treat as derogatory, and I have been keeping my promise ever since.
The ongoing Ukrainian crisis has evoked strong passions in Poland, the Baltic States and Romania. The fear of Russia is palpable in politicians' remarks and in the media. Finland's attitudes are generally much calmer, though the media are typically placing the nation on a red alert. Finland, after all, resisted Stalin's attack, and successfully defended their independence. Stalin respected that, in his own way, by allowing Finland to remain unoccupied by the Soviet forces at the end of World War II.
Inevitably, the current situation in Ukraine has intensified the long-simmering debate in Finland about joining NATO. Proponents of accession argue that membership in the alliance is the only guarantee of Russia's non-intervention. It is not clear, however, why Russia should want to invade Finland, with which it has had excellent relations for close to seventy years now, and which it has learned to respect from the Winter War onward.
That respect is not due to Finland's neutrality, as such, but to Finland's stubborn independence. During the Cold War, it learned to manage the Soviet Union much better than vice versa. After the Cold War, after initial hesitation, Moscow accepted Finland's decision to join the European Union as part of the process of European economic integration. NATO membership, by contrast, would be seen by Russia as the end of Finland's precious strategic independence.
About the Author
Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.
- Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space
- What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West RevealedCommentary
Dmitri Trenin
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Europe
- The Speech Ursula von der Leyen Can’t DeliverCommentary
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is about to give her annual address on the state of the EU. Here’s what she won’t—but should—say.
Rym Momtaz
- Europe Fails to Learn the Lessons from CeutaCommentary
The aftermath of the Ceuta crisis shows Europe has drawn the wrong lessons. Rather than doubling down on failed migration policies, the EU needs to address the underlying roots of such episodes.
Richard Youngs
- Taking the Pulse: Is Canada Leading a Third Way?Commentary
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has twice inspired praise for standing up to U.S. President Donald Trump: at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos and on Canada-U.S. trade negotiations. Is Carney showing a third way better than the EU has in dealing with the Trump administration?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- Europe’s Self-Confidence ProblemCommentary
The EU’s responses to two recent incidents expose the gulf between European perceptions and capabilities. Unless the union can bridge that gap, it will never become a real geostrategic power.
Rym Momtaz
- Europe’s Overseas Countries and Territories as Geopolitical AssetsArticle
European states control several Overseas Countries and Territories around the world that carry strategic, economic, and environmental weight. As great powers challenge the rules-based order, defending them is a geopolitical imperative for Europe.
Marc Pierini
