• Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Europe logoCarnegie lettermark logo
EUDemocracy
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Alissa de Carbonnel"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "blog": "Strategic Europe",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Europe"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Europe",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "regions": [
    "Europe",
    "Ukraine",
    "Russia",
    "United States"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "EU",
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}
Strategic Europe logo

Source: Getty

Commentary
Strategic Europe

Why Europe Must Take Charge of its Russia Diplomacy Now

Trump is distracted and Ukraine wants Europe to step up. The continent’s leaders must find their voice and assert it in talks with Russia.

Link Copied
By Alissa de Carbonnel
Published on Jul 23, 2026
Strategic Europe

Blog

Strategic Europe

Strategic Europe offers insightful analysis, fresh commentary, and concrete policy recommendations from some of Europe’s keenest international affairs observers.

Learn More

European leaders are celebrating having nudged U.S. President Donald Trump from exasperation to sympathy for Ukraine. But it will be a short-lived reprieve if they remain sidelined from renewed U.S.-Russia talks, or worse, if the quagmire in Iran and U.S. midterm elections divert Trump’s attention when Kyiv sees a fast-closing window to try to pressure Moscow to the table.

While credit is due for the Europeans’ deft diplomacy, Trump’s mood swing is underpinned by material changes that have taken place since he rolled out the red carpet for Russian President Vladimir Putin a year ago. Ukraine is no longer on the back foot, Europe has taken over as Kyiv’s main backer, and a distant payoff from resetting bilateral ties with Russia has sunk low on the president’s priority list.

Putin’s lack of a quick path to victory in the fifth year of war opens the possibility for talks, but also for escalation. The fear that Trump’s envoys will cut a destabilizing deal over Europeans’ heads is the driving force behind calls by a growing number of leaders to assert their right to a seat at the table. But France, Germany, and the UK have been seeking their own lines to the Kremlin because they recognize the need for guardrails and de-escalation mechanisms that do not go through the White House. To advance this cause, a coalition of Ukraine’s main European backers, expanded from the E3 to include Italy, Poland, and other willing nations, should nominate an envoy.

European divisions over when, who, and how to engage arise not only from well-founded mistrust of Putin but also an outdated apprehension about one another’s historical dealings with Russia. The Russian leader has made a mockery of French and German diplomacy since the start of the conflict in 2014, but that experience has shaped the continent’s imperfect yet definitive break from business with Russia, unprecedented military buildup, and paradigm-shifting unity on support for Ukraine since the 2022 full-scale invasion. Differences on Russia—while still important—are increasingly a question of degrees of deterrence. Europe should no longer seek to mediate, but rather assert interests that overlap with, or go beyond, Kyiv’s.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has pushed Europe to take a bigger role in talks, fearing U.S. distraction as diplomacy stagnated in February, just as he began doing “pretty well” at “holding his own,” according to Trump’s estimation. Bereft of access to the Starlink satellite internet system, Russian logistics are prey to mid-range drones, and Ukraine is exporting that know-how. Its deep strike campaign is causing such severe fuel shortages that Putin has been forced to address their impact. But Kyiv’s momentum may not last. Zelensky’s dismissal of a defense minister credited for Ukraine’s technological edge raises questions about that edge’s sustainability, and mobilization remains a major challenge. Russia may yet counter or replicate Kyiv’s advances. Come autumn, Ukraine’s chief concern will be how to survive another winter of Russian bombardment, with energy infrastructure still damaged and Patriot interceptor missiles scarce.

The Kremlin wants talks with Washington as long as it believes it can cut a favorable deal—or at least force Zelensky to consider unpopular concessions. But Russian officials have recently voiced frustration that Trump has not delivered on “the spirit of Anchorage,” a phrase they use to refer to what Russia asserts were territorial trade-offs agreed in principle at a Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska in August 2025. European leaders and diplomats worked hard to head that off. But while Russia has slammed U.S. support for Kyiv as incompatible with its mediation, it remains at pains not to criticize Trump. Calls with the White House afford Putin status and allow him to cast himself as peace-seeking.

Russia’s exclusion of Europeans from talks is based on a belief that the continent is subservient to Washington and that EU support for Ukraine will eventually crumble. That view is out of touch. As a result of Trump forcing Europeans to step up on Ukraine, they have gained leverage. Much of what the Kremlin wants from talks—sanctions relief, a veto over NATO deployments, and a limitation of military assistance to Ukraine—lies in Europe’s hands. Ukraine, meanwhile, has grown skeptical of U.S. security guarantees as part of a deal. It has improved its military position despite Trump cutting off military aid, and it increasingly relies on European backers. Europeans must also press Trump, who is well aware that his leverage has eroded relative to Europe’s, to demand their inclusion in any further diplomacy.

The road to overcoming Moscow’s reluctance to deal with Europeans is through more support for Kyiv, more pressure on Russia, and speedier rearmament. It is also crucial to speak to Russia with one voice. Europe’s military capabilities, political unity, and resolve are still insufficient to make it an indispensable interlocutor in the discussions on the continent’s security architecture that Putin has long desired. Yet, with a security and defense awakening underway, that status may finally be within reach.

Naming an envoy would put the ball in Russia’s court. Russians are feeling the bite of fuel shortages, a stagnating economy, and soaring inflation. Casualties outpace recruitment. Mobile internet blackouts belie claims of normality. Crimea has gone from tourist destination to depopulated wasteland. The CEO of state-owned Sberbank and a Russian fertilizer magnate are among a growing number of elites deploring the cost of the war. Proposed U.S. sanctions backed by Trump could deprive Russia of windfall energy revenues from the Iran war. The EU, meanwhile, clinched a deal on a sweeping twenty-first sanctions package, including a freeze to the bloc’s price cap on Russian crude oil for twelve months. Yet so far, Putin appears to be leaning toward hardliners calling for escalation.

The coming two months still offer a slim window for restarting talks. Whether they do so or not, Europeans cannot continue to rely exclusively on a White House that has swung intermittently from hostility, to support, to distraction as it manages diplomacy and escalation risks in the continent’s biggest land war since the Second World War.

Get more news and analysis from
Strategic Europe

Subscribe to Strategic Europe, delivered every Tuesday and Thursday!

About the Author

Alissa de Carbonnel

European Security Analyst

Alissa de Carbonnel is a European security policy analyst focused on rearmament. Over two decades, she has reported and led research teams across Europe, Russia, and Eurasia with Reuters and the International Crisis Group.

Alissa de Carbonnel
European Security Analyst
Alissa de Carbonnel
EUForeign PolicyEuropeUkraineRussiaUnited States

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Strategic Europe

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Why Russia Could Escalate Hybrid Warfare Against Europe

    Mounting economic strain and battlefield losses will not necessarily make the Kremlin less dangerous. They could instead push Moscow toward a more aggressive hybrid campaign designed to test NATO’s Eastern flank, exploit allied hesitation, and fracture European resolve.

      Maksym Beznosiuk

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Enough with the Annual NATO Summits, Already?

    Over the past ten years, NATO has held almost as many summits as it did during the entirety of the Cold War. Are they still useful, or is it time to stop holding annual meetings?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    European Sycophancy Worked on Trump

    Nearly a year and a half after Europeans leaned into sucking up to Trump, the strategy has produced some benefits when it comes to Ukraine.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    The Le Pen Verdict: How French Politics Turned MAGA

    Far-right leader Marine Le Pen can—and will—run in France’s next presidential election. What does the outcome of her appeal against a 2025 embezzlement conviction mean for the country’s political future?

      Catherine Fieschi

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Why Europe Cannot Negotiate a New Yalta with Russia

    While Russia is not ready to sue for peace on Europe’s terms, it could still either seek a ceasefire in Ukraine or try escalation. Brussels needs to prepare for both and prioritize that preparation over normative discussions.

      Kadri Liik

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
Carnegie Europe logo, white
Rue du Congrès, 151000 Brussels, Belgium
  • Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Gender Equality Plan
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.