Asia’s convulsive decolonization in the decade following the Second World War paved the way for an entirely new politico-economic order, particularly in the eastern stretch of the continent from India to the Philippines. After the fall of European empires, the region required fresh security arrangements, overhauled trading structures, and means to induce collective action among its postcolonial states. India, as one of the most economically advanced and diplomatically well-positioned countries in Asia, stood at the center of this emerging order. What kind of roles did the Indian elites envision for the country to play in the region? How did Indian involvement shape the order? Just as significantly, when and how did India turn away from Asia and become “peripheral” to this order?
Carnegie India hosted Sandeep Bhardwaj for a discussion on locating India within the wider geopolitical flux between 1939 and 1960 which the newly decolonised states of Asia found themselves in. The discussion was moderated by Srinath Raghavan.
DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS
A Decade of Romance (1939-1949): Participants reviewed India’s engagement with the countries in East Asia in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. This decade witnessed India actively engaging the states with a vision for Asian regionalism at large. Its vision for Asia translated into policy prescriptions which were crucial to tether it to a systematic line of engagement with the other states. The first one being ‘strengthening nationalism’ which asserted the decolonisation project and stabilizing the newly independent states. The second, ‘regional security’ entailed accommodating China, advocating against military pacts in the near region and strengthening its buffer states, a colonial anxiety India inherited from the British Imperial Rule. ‘Development’ shaped India’s contours of engagement with the region wherein it promoted protectionism and planning and also advocated for a “Marshall Plan for Asia.” The other factor which drove India’s active engagement with East Asia was ‘regionalism’. India proposed to form Asia Cooperative Unit, a regional organization with 22 constituent states including Australia and New Zealand, much before the advent of ASEAN and on a grander scale. Participants churned out these broad parameters within which India actively engaged with Asian partners and occupied the central stage in the geopolitics of Asia.
The Year of Reassessment (1950): Participants deliberated over a marked change in India’s policies and actions in 1950 which laid the groundwork of an eventual disengagement from Asia. The year 1950 was pivotal in India’s foreign policy as it became passive to the expectations of its Asian partners and limited its level of engagement with them. Various factors caused this upturn in the Indian decision making paradigm. Participants pointed to the formation of the Planning Commission in 1950 as one of the endogenous factors for such a policy shift. The Planning Commission promoted the idea of India being endowed with limited resources and the need to seek out its own development as priority. It advocated against the full fledged engagement with external partners owing to its limited capacity and promoting parsimony within the ranks of government internally. Participants pointed out that The Korean War (1950-53) proved to be an external stimulus which compelled India to retract its steps and reassess its policy on engaging with regional powers. The Korean War moved away from a localized country specific conflict to engulf other countries in its periphery. The involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union also fanned the narrative of Asia being a “dangerous place” within the Indian corridors of decision making which was vehemently against dragging the newly independent country in a war not of its own making. The priority for India was to insulate itself from the scourge of war, specially from the Great Power rivalry. This reassessment constituted the prologue to a decade long uneasy ‘divorce’ with Asia where India tried to periodically resist the urges of friendly countries in the region for active engagement.
Divestiture of Interests (1950s): Participants discussed a new set of beliefs which went on to influence India’s policy and nature of engagement with Asia during the 1950s. These beliefs gradually upended the story of active engagement with Asia to eventually ‘losing’ it. Some of these beliefs which transpired from domestic government and diplomatic churning were instrumental in shaping the narrative as well as the policies of regional engagement. These were stemming from the narrative that India did not find complementarity in economic cooperation with the countries in East Asia. It resulted in reduced exports to the region and a gradual fillip to trade with Africa and Europe in primary commodities. The other factor which swayed India’s interest was the notion of decolonisation being an inevitable phenomenon and therefore, it not having to be the priority in its purpose of engagement with other states. Participants also deliberated over the lackluster efforts to engage the diaspora in the near region. India did not feel the need to nurture and maintain strong ties with the diaspora which constituted an important variable for engaging the states in the region. These notions spilled into India’s policy constructs which eventually saw it move to the periphery from being at the center of Asian geopolitics.
This summary was prepared by Ayush Mohan, intern with the Security Studies program at Carnegie India.
