There are so many economic, political, and military factors pulling Moscow and Tehran closer together that individuals are almost irrelevant.
Nikita Smagin is an expert on Iran with the Russian International Affairs Council.
There are so many economic, political, and military factors pulling Moscow and Tehran closer together that individuals are almost irrelevant.
We appear to be witnessing the emergence of a united front against Washington that extends from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf.
Moscow has little to gain from a major flare-up in the Red Sea, which means Washington’s efforts to stop Houthi attacks on shipping are likely to be quietly welcomed.
Events in the Middle East have helped the Kremlin convince itself that Russia’s foreign policy in recent years has been the right one.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia actively borrowed Western—primarily European—legal and bureaucratic practices. Now that the European path appears to be closed off entirely, the Middle East is fast emerging as an alternative route.
Syria has not only failed to become a secure base for Russian forces in the Middle East, but is increasingly generating its own crises.
Iran’s goal is to modernize its transport infrastructure using Russian money, and Moscow has little choice but to foot the bill.
The UAE will try to take advantage of the sanctions war between Russia and the West, but ultimately it cannot afford to ignore pressure from the United States and other Western countries.
Russia has no plans to leave Syria, but is increasingly unwilling to intervene in the country’s domestic affairs, whether militarily or financially.
It might seem that for Iran, the West’s attempt to isolate Russia is a good opportunity to fill the resulting market gaps. In practice, however, it only creates new problems.