Source: India Abroad
India and Nuclear SecurityThis week, President Barack Obama is hosting the first-ever Nuclear Security Summit. Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis, former Bush administration official both at the Department of State and the National Security Council, who was intimately involved in negotiating the US-India civilian nuclear deal, and who is still called upon by Obama administration officials for his expertise, explains to Aziz Haniffa what to expect from India at the White House.
Deputy National Security Adviser Michael Froman last month said at the Seventh US-India High Technology Cooperation Meeting that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s attendance at the Nuclear Security Summit will be key to its success. Was this just hyperbole or do Dr Singh and India really bring this kind of gravitas to the summit?
There is no reason to think that Froman’s statement is merely hyperbole. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s presence at the summit is important for critical substantive reasons. First, it symbolizes India’s partnership with the United States on an issue that is very important to President Barack Obama personally. Second, it epitomizes the support of a key country that, along with the US and Israel, would be among the most likely victims of nuclear terrorism, should the summit’s objectives not be realized. Third, and most importantly, it demonstrates that a responsible nuclear power such as India, although not a signatory to the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty), nevertheless supports the US and the international community in strengthening the global nonproliferation regime.
All these considerations taken together make India’s presence at the summit significant. It is not often realized that India has worked very closely with the US behind the scenes to make this summit a success. Hence, Prime Minister Singh’s participation will be all the more welcome.
At the Woodrow Wilson Center, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said New Delhi believes the summit can be a milestone in addressing the nuclear terrorism threat. How?
India has been deeply concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism. In part, this is simply because of its proximity to Pakistan, which has historically been the fountainhead of both nuclear proliferation and political terrorism. Indian officials are still fearful about infirmities in Pakistan’s nuclear program. But more generally, they are afraid that if extremist groups manage to get their hands on nuclear materials or a nuclear device, India would be among the primary targets for their vengeance. The government of India hopes that the nuclear security summit will serve as a consciousness-raising event that highlights the threat of nuclear terrorism, mobilizes international action towards combating this threat, and produces an action plan to deal with the most troubling challenges in this arena.
India has apparently offered to set up an international center on nuclear security and even said it would fund and sustain this center. This is rumored to be one of the proposals Prime Minister Singh will bring to the table at the summit. How important and tangible of a contribution will such a center be — if India makes such an offer — not just in helping to assist in nuclear security, but in terms of India’s bona fides to play a proactive role in securing and safeguarding nuclear material, particularly for a country which is not a party to the NPT?
I believe India’s offer to set up such a center of excellence focusing on issues of nuclear security will be a significant contribution for several reasons. First, no such institution currently exists, or at least none which offers opportunities to operators of nuclear facilities worldwide. Second, given the prospective increase in nuclear power investments worldwide, including in developing countries, training operators in regard to best practices relating to nuclear security will be a critical element of the success of the coming ‘nuclear renaissance’. Third, offering to set up such a center offers the best evidence of India’s responsible stewardship — it represents a contribution that India is willing to make towards building a secure global regime.
Apparently, with the Democrats losing their filibusterproof majority in the Senate, this effectively gets India off the hook in terms of the Obama administration’s pressure for India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. Do you believe the US will continue to try to influence India to join the CTBT, and ultimately the NPT, in lieu of the administration implementing the US-India civilian nuclear deal?
I think the prospect of CTBT ratification in the US Senate is virtually zero—for the foreseeable future. Consequently, I cannot imagine the administration making any effort to lean on India to sign the CTBT. If it did, such an action would have no credibility whatsoever — and India would respond appropriately.
The threat of nuclear terrorism will be a priority agenda item of the summit. Does India live with this danger more than any other nation?
I think the single biggest priority would be to develop and secure consensus on the need to safeguard nuclear materials to certain universally accepted standards. This will not be easy because it will require extensive reviews of current practices worldwide and many remedial actions, some of which will no doubt be costly. But the alternatives are obviously far more dangerous. The biggest threat out there is actually complacency —because the various extremist groups seeking nuclear materials are anything but inactive.
Pakistan has assured and senior Pentagon officials like Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen have endorsed Islamabad’s contention that its nuclear arsenal is safe and will not fall into terrorist hands. Are these assurances sufficient? Do you believe the summit has to obtain fresh pledges and assurances from Pakistan?
The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has increased significantly since 2001, in large part because of the concerted efforts made by Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai and Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division. International pressures undoubtedly contributed to these reforms, as did the terrible activities of A Q Khan. Securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, however, will have to be a continual effort because the political, ideological and social trends in that country are not reassuring. My summary judgment in testimony before Congress has been that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities are reasonably secure in peacetime. Fixing the weaknesses in security that remain cannot be done through action at the summit. It has to be done through quiet and continued diplomacy between Washington and Islamabad.
Considering the nuclear black market that A Q Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, ran and that he has not been made accessible to US authorities for interrogation, are Islamabad’s assurances credible?
At this point, no one in the international community will be satisfied by Islamabad’s assurances alone. But the objective of increasing the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will not be served by publicly humiliating Pakistan. Rather, the international community has to work with Pakistani leaders to reinforce the point that Pakistan itself will be the biggest loser if the disasters unleashed by A Q Khan, either alone or at State behest, were to recur.
One of Pakistan’s priorities on its 56-page wish list was a civilian nuclear deal similar to the one the US has with India.
I can understand why Islamabad would ask for such a deal. It has less to do with energy and everything to do with seeking parity of treatment with India. Obviously, this is not a request that has the slightest chance of being acceded to: President Obama will not consent to such a deal, and Congress will resolutely refuse to amend US law for Pakistan’s sake, given Islamabad’s egregious nonproliferation record.
Administration officials say such a deal with Pakistan is a nonstarter. The likes of Senator John F Kerry have said Pakistan has miles to go before such a deal. What’s
your take on this?
There are clearly some within the administration and some outside who think giving Pakistan a nuclear deal similar to that given to India is a good idea. Those holding such a view though are in a distinct minority. I do not know what Senator Kerry’s actual views on this subject are, though it appears as if he is attempting to at least leave the door open for such a deal with Pakistan in the future. I don’t believe President Obama will go down such a road, but I am uncertain whether his administration will say so clearly and distinctly to Pakistan. Consequently, it is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that the Pakistani delegation to the recently concluded strategic dialogue actually believes that a nuclear deal for Islamabad is on the cards merely because its American counterparts were unable or unwilling to say clearly what everyone who has the slightest knowledge of American politics knows to be true today — that a nuclear deal for Pakistan is sheer fantasy.
President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreeing to a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty agreement — the most far-reaching in more than 20 years — undeniably gives the summit a huge momentum. India, of course, has been calling for universal disarmament for nearly six decades. But what does this agreement do for nuclear rapprochement between India and Pakistan? There is this paranoia in Washington, DC, particularly in Congressional circles, about a conflict between India and Pakistan leading to a possible nuclear confrontation.
The new START agreement has no impact on South Asia. Pakistan today has the fastest growing nuclear program in all of Asia. Islamabad has, for understandable reasons, a nuclear first use policy. But it also has, more troublingly, a provocative strategy of exploiting its nuclear umbrella to wage sub-conventional wars against India. None of these dangers shows any signs of abating — and they could get a lot worse if the military leadership in Pakistan chooses to stay its present course. I am not one usually given to paranoia about nuclear war in the Indian subcontinent, but Pakistan’s strategic policies are to my mind reckless and dangerous. And neither India nor the United States has been able to persuade Pakistan to change course.
You have strongly advocated India to be a party to the Proliferation Security Initiative particularly since India and the US had been cooperating in maritime security in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere in apprehending nuclear proliferation material.
I hope India makes good on its promise to join the PSI. New Delhi already supports US initiatives to interdict illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction materials. So, it is simply a matter of formalizing what India does already. It is not well known but India actually came close to signing the PSI at some point in the past — but some infelicitous
American diplomacy ended up making things difficult. Hopefully, India will join the PSI sooner rather than later not as a favor to the US — because it is not — but because it is squarely in India’s interests to defeat the illicit trade in WMD materials and technologies.
This summit will arguably discuss the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as a facet of nuclear security. India has said it would be willing to be a party to this treaty, but do you think India should lead on this, notwithstanding Pakistan’s posture?
Absolutely. India should lead the effort because the FMCT is a verifiable, non-discriminatory agreement. It does not undermine Indian security. And, it is part of the larger Indian commitment to disarmament.
India, although voting with the US both at the International Atomic Energy Agency and calling for Iran to adhere to its NPT commitments, has been advising against punitive sanctions against Tehran. Nirupama Rao called for dialogue and diplomacy, saying sanctions would hurt the people of Iran and destabilize that country and the region. But considering the gung-ho attitude in Congress and also with President Obama’s efforts for dialogue with Iran failing miserably, won’t this mount immense pressure on India on this front?
I think this pressure is coming — not specifically directed against India but at all States that continue to do ‘business as usual’ with Iran. At some point, India will have to make up its mind about how important a threat an Iranian nuclear weapons program is to India’s security, and act upon it. I think we are soon coming to a point where hard choices will be required regarding Iran — both in Washington and in New Delhi.
What would you recommend will be the most astute path for India to follow so as not to displease its most ardent supporters in Congress, who nonetheless have grave concerns over India’s close relations with Iran?
I think India must continue to do what it has done already: To condemn the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons capabilities through all means.
One of the most significant hurdles to the implementation of the US-India nuclear deal was finally settled with the successful completion of the negotiations of US permission for India to reprocess US-origin and US companies supplied reactors’ spent fuel. Do you think now this deal, two years after President Bush signed it into law, will finally see the light of day and eliminate any doubts in India that the Obama administration for all its exhortations is not committed to it?
I have always said — even before the reprocessing agreement was concluded — that the Obama administration, to its credit, had not walked back a single element of the Bush-Singh civilian nuclear agreement. This deal will be consummated without further hurdles. The Congress is supportive, and has been for some time now. I think it is really a new beginning.