Source: Munich Calling

Anyone remember the atmosphere two years ago at the Munich Security Conference? It was not dominated by the global financial crisis or Afghanistan.  Instead, arms control was the buzzword. U.S. Senator John Kerry, and Richard Burt, a leading member of the Global Zero Commission whose goal is to rid the world of nuclear weapons within two decades, delivered riveting speeches.

Just a few weeks earlier, U.S. president Barack Obama had received the Nobel Peace Prize for his commitment to reducing nuclear arms. The administration’s decision to ‘reset’ the button with Russia added even more hope, especially when talks for a new START, or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks, gathered momentum.

That treaty, signed in Prague in April 2010, stipulated that by February 2018, each side must cap its strategic nuclear arsenal at 1,550 warheads. It also limits both sides’ deployed nuclear systems to 700 ICBMS, or inter-continental ballistic missiles, as well as sea-based ballistic missiles are allowed in reserve.

When it came into force last year, there was guarded optimism that arms control would move to the top of the security agenda of other countries too.  But that has not happened. If anything, arms control is on the back burner, both in the U.S. and Russia. For the Europeans, it is hardly an issue, despite the developments in Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

What is the reason?

The Obama administration worked hard to get START ratified in Congress in December 2010. It was a bruising experience. Domestic considerations now take precedent, especially during an election year.  Neither is Russia prepared to do much more for arms control. "Russia’s large nuclear arsenal, along with its seat on the U.N. Security Council, is the last vestige of its great power status,” said James Acton, security expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “There is concern in Moscow about further arms control.

Take tactical nuclear weapons. When President Obama signed START in 2010, he said the United States wanted reductions across all categories, including tactical and non-deployed warheads.  Even when the Senate voted for START, it called for talks with Russia to reduce the huge disparity in U.S. and Russia tactical nuclear weapons.  Nothing has happened.

NATO, for one, ran scared. When German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle announced in 2009 that Germany would unilaterally try and get rid of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. on German territory, some NATO allies, particularly Poland, balked. Warsaw insisted that any withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons could only happen if Russia reduced its huge arsenal at the same time.

According to the bipartisan U.S. Strategic Posture Commission, Russia has 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads and numerous reserves. Russia will not confirm that figure. Nor will any NATO country confirm that there are around 250 American operational warheads in Europe.  Rolf Nikel, the federal commissioner for disarmament and arms control at the German foreign ministry said recently that NATO was retaining its tactical nuclear weapons because “the debate is more about their political value for Alliance cohesion and solidarity than about their real deterrence value. If so, then it says much about the state of the transatlantic alliance. Russia has its own reasons for holding onto its stockpile:Its tactical nuclear force is a valuable card to play, whether in missile defense talks, or other issues.

More puzzling is Russia’s refusal to rejoin the Conventional Forces in Europe talks. It pulled out of the CFE talks in 2007 after refusing to implement the amended 1999 CFE treaty. The treaty was one of the relics of the Cold War. It was negotiated when NATO and the Warsaw Pact stood eyeball across a divided Europe.  The sticking point now is the Caucasus. Russia has failed to withdraw its forces from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Moldova as stipulated by the amended treaty.  The U.S. initially tried to restart the talks, even modernize the treaty.

But last November, U.S. state department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland and former top diplomat responsible for pushing CFE back onto the table, announced that the U.S. would “cease carrying out certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia.” No time was fixed for new talks.

None of this is good news. CFE is about deepening trust and creating a viable verification regime. The longer the negotiations remain suspended, the greater the damage to that trust.  Another treaty in limbo, and for more than a decade, is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty aimed at prohibiting all nuclear test explosions.

The CTBT has already been signed and ratified by 154 U.N. countries, including Russia, Japan, South Korea and all NATO countries. But before the treaty can enter into force, it needs ratification by 44 named states. Of these -- India, Pakistan, and North Korea have yet to sign the Treaty. A further six states - China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the United States -- have signed but not ratified it.

Security experts say they are not optimistic that the U.S. will ratify it in 2012. It might happen during a second Obama administration, if the Democrats continue to control the Senate. Were it to happen, the Arms Control Association, a non-partisan organization, believes that the U.S. could pressure other countries to shelve their nuclear programs or at least engage more productively with the international community.

It is hard to prove that.  But if the U.S, Russia and the Europeans, could join forces, it might make a big difference to reviving arms control.

This article was originally published in the Munich Security Conference's Munich Calling.