• Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Europe logoCarnegie lettermark logo
EUUkraine
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Judy Dempsey"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "blog": "Strategic Europe",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Europe"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Europe",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "regions": [
    "Europe",
    "Germany"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "EU",
    "Democracy",
    "Subnational Affairs"
  ]
}
Strategic Europe logo

Source: Getty

Commentary
Strategic Europe

Germany’s Shattered Consensus

An overwhelming victory by a far-right-wing party in a small state in eastern Germany will have major repercussions for Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s coalition.

Link Copied
By Judy Dempsey
Published on Sep 8, 2026
Strategic Europe

Blog

Strategic Europe

Strategic Europe offers insightful analysis, fresh commentary, and concrete policy recommendations from some of Europe’s keenest international affairs observers.

Learn More

The Alternative for Germany (AfD), an extremist far-right party, has come first in the election to Saxony-Anhalt’s state parliament, more than doubling its vote share from the previous election five years ago. But it fell short of an absolute majority by just three seats.

Once a small party founded in 2013 by Euroskeptic west German economists, the AfD won 43.8 percent of the vote, up from 20.8 percent in 2021. German Chancelor Friedrich Merz’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which had governed the state since 1990, lost nearly twenty points, landing in second place with 17.2 percent against 37.1 percent in 2021.

Although the state is small, with only 2.1 million inhabitants, and the second poorest in Germany, the AfD’s landslide could upend the country’s post-Second World War consensus.

It will be the first time since 1945 that a far-right-wing party is on the verge of being catapulted into power. This confirms the fragmentation of Germany’s political system and dents the country’s reputation as a predictable, stable operator—a reputation that is crucial to its role as the EU’s largest economy. And it shows the difficulties faced by established parties in dealing with immigration, social uncertainty, and economic insecurity that populist parties have tapped into.

The AfD’s success in Saxony-Anhalt is due to its thirty-five-year-old lead candidate, Ulrich Siegmund. His relentless campaigning, especially on social media, his charisma, and his ability to exploit voters’ disillusionment with Germany’s political establishment contrasted with the staid campaigning of the CDU and the Social Democrats.

Whether it was his anti-immigration platform, his anti-EU polemics, his pro-Russia stance, or promises to stop aid and weapons to Ukraine, each topic struck a chord with voters. Election slogans—“we want our country back” and “everything is possible”—along with chants of “we are the people” at a major rally in the state capital, Magdeburg, played into voters’ sense of grievance. In interview after interview, people told me they were nostalgic for the old days of communist East Germany, the German Democratic Republic. “Everything was certain, everything was easier. We had jobs,” said Marlies, aged seventy-one: “The AfD understands us.”

Siegmund’s victory, the AfD’s success overall, and how the party translates its electoral success into delivering on campaign promises will be scrutinized by other populist movements across Europe, where immigration, inflation, energy costs, and lack of affordable housing are common issues.

With elections due in France, Poland, and Spain in 2027, populist and nationalist parties may try and emulate some of the AfD’s tactics.

Having fallen just short of an absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt, the party is now in for a few uncertain weeks. Siegmund has thirty days to form a state government. He could take the risk of leading a minority government—which would need to be approved by the party—or enter into coalition with the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a far-left-wing, pro-Russia, and anti-EU party that won five seats. That would be enough to give Siegmund the absolute majority of forty-two votes in the eighty-three-seat legislature. He could also attempt to recruit some defectors from other parties.

For now, nothing is certain. At an election rally in Magdeburg, AfD supporters balked at the idea of depending on the BSW.

The party’s national leadership has already appealed to the CDU to cooperate. Tino Chrupalla, the AfD’s national coleader said it was time for CDU lawmakers to make a “center-right conservative majority [in Saxony-Anhalt]” possible.

Merz, however, is sticking to the so-called “Brandmauer” policy: a firewall that essentially rules out cooperation—even though some does take place at the local level.

Any CDU defections in the Saxony-Anhalt parliament would weaken the party even further in the polls. It would be considered a highly unpopular move and would give more legitimacy to the AfD. In addition, it would call into question Merz’s ability to keep his party united at a time when the AfD is running ahead with 29 percent in the national polls compared to the CDU’s 21 percent. The chancellor recognized what was at stake. “This shakes our party to its very foundations,” he said the day after the election, “we cannot simply carry on as before, nor can I, nor can the federal government […] our party system is undergoing a tectonic shift.”

That constellation comprised conservatives, social democrats, and liberals. With the addition of the environmental movement during the 1980s, the system was anchored on a strong constitution designed to protect the country’s post-1945 democratic institutions and on consensus politics.

The result in Saxony-Anhalt challenges that consensus in ways that could have repercussions for pending state elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. There, the AfD will try and piggy-back on this success.

With these state elections in mind, Merz insisted his governing coalition in Berlin would stick to its new reform program. It involves an overhaul of the pension, health, and social welfare systems, in addition to spending more on infrastructure and defense.

But the coalition parties have a fundamental challenge: They have depended on the older generation for their support, giving them regular pension increases. This has alienated a younger generation that has grown disillusioned with the political status quo.

Merz is now under immense pressure to regain the political initiative. His popularity is at an all-time low since becoming chancellor in 2025. His coalition has spent much of its time squabbling over how to rein in social welfare benefits and how to deal with climate issues.

If Merz is to survive as chancellor until the next federal election in 2029, he needs to take one big lesson from the AfD’s repeated successes on the local level. It is about listening to voters and talking to them. It is about explaining why his reforms should and can work. It is about being open with the public. All of which takes time. But Saxony-Anhalt shows how time is not a luxury for Germany’s waning status quo.

Get more news and analysis from
Strategic Europe

Subscribe to Strategic Europe, delivered every Tuesday and Thursday!

About the Author

Judy Dempsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

Judy Dempsey is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    Europe Needs to Hear What America is Saying

      Judy Dempsey

  • Commentary
    Babiš’s Victory in Czechia Is Not a Turning Point for European Populists

      Judy Dempsey

Judy Dempsey
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe
Judy Dempsey
EUDemocracySubnational AffairsEuropeGermany

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Strategic Europe

  • Carney Canada EU Trump
    Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Is Canada Leading a Third Way?

    Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has twice inspired praise for standing up to U.S. President Donald Trump: at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos and on Canada-U.S. trade negotiations. Is Carney showing a third way better than the EU has in dealing with the Trump administration?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

  • Von der Leyen Antonio Costa EU Europe
    Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Europe’s Self-Confidence Problem

    The EU’s responses to two recent incidents expose the gulf between European perceptions and capabilities. Unless the union can bridge that gap, it will never become a real geostrategic power.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Europe far right MAGA Trump
    Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Why MAGA’s Far-Right European Ties Will Endure

    In supporting Europe’s far-right, MAGA and Russia both want the same thing: a weaker EU. Europe must defend itself without abandoning the openness these forces exploit.

      • Armida van rij

      Armida van Rij

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Letter from the Editor: Europe Takes Two Steps Forward But One Step Back

    As we close out another season of Strategic Europe, it is worth taking stock of the deep shifts underway.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Are the EU’s Watered-Down Russia Sanctions Better than None?

    The EU had to compromise to adopt a twenty-first sanctions package against Russia, exposing growing cracks in the union’s resolve. Is this latest, weaker round worth it to keep pressure on Moscow?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
Carnegie Europe logo, white
Rue du Congrès, 151000 Brussels, Belgium
  • Research
  • Strategic Europe
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Gender Equality Plan
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Europe
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.