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Q&A

Electing a New Japan?

The best possible outcome of Japan’s upcoming elections is the formation of a stable government that breaks the policy inertia plaguing the country.

Published on December 7, 2012

Japan heads to the polls to elect a new lower house of parliament on December 16. In a Q&A, James L. Schoff analyzes what’s at stake in the election. Schoff says the best possible outcome is a result that leads to the formation of a stable government that breaks the policy inertia and parliamentary gridlock plaguing Japan. Unfortunately, with a tangle of pressing issues to consider and a large number of undecided voters, the potential for another weak coalition government is high.

What is at stake in the vote?

Japan is electing its house of representatives, which is the most powerful legislative body that decides the prime minister and has the most say in budgeting. Voters will cast two votes: one for their local representative (one of 300 seats) and one for a political party (to decide how to allocate the 180 proportional representation seats). This is Japan’s biggest election since 2009.

Who are the leading parties and players competing in the election?

A record number—twelve—parties are registered for the election, but there are four main parties and coalitions to watch.

The ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda kicks off its reelection bid at a moment of weakness. The DPJ government served for three years—after breaking the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) dominance over politics since the 1950s—but it fractured and weakened as the public became disillusioned by the DPJ’s inability to follow through on the promises that swept the party into power in 2009.

While the DPJ is a leaner and more cohesive party now after several members bolted, it will be hard for the party to overcome voter disappointment in its performance and it is bound to lose more seats.

The LDP, the main opposition party headed by former prime minister Shinzo Abe, is on the rise and polling higher than any other party. The LDP held power on its own for decades and near the end of its run partnered with New Komeito, a smaller Buddhist party. The two generally agree on a governing approach and together could win a majority.

The DPJ and LDP are not the whole story. With a large percentage of Japanese not committing to a particular party (by some measures, 50 percent with a week left to go), the swing voters could throw their support behind a third force.

The most intriguing and popular of the other two main options is the Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin). This new party was created by the mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, and he joined forces with the former governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara.

The two couldn’t be more opposite. Hashimoto is a young up-and-comer who rails against traditional politics and urges the empowerment of local prefectures. Ishihara is a longtime politician who is well known for his staunch nationalism. He was the one who helped reignite the dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu in China) when he tried to buy them from a private owner earlier this year. While the pair has had a hard time rationalizing their policy platforms, the Restoration Party is currently polling at a comparable level to the DPJ.

A similar dynamic is playing out in the other conglomeration, the Future Party (Nippon Mirai). The governor of the Shiga Prefecture, Yukiko Kada, has teamed up with the veteran lawmaker Ichiro Ozawa, who split with the DPJ earlier this year because of a dispute over a hike in the consumption tax. The two are primarily running on an anti-nuclear-power pledge, which is one of the main issues in the campaign.

Where do the parties fall on the ideological spectrum?

While parties will be looking to differentiate themselves in the coming weeks of campaigning, in truth there are no clear ideological breaks among the groups. Their stands on different policies overlap in varying combinations. It is a bit of a muddle.

The centrist DPJ is pledging to phase out nuclear energy in Japan over a longer time period than the Future Party and is promoting participation in the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade initiative in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Noda has also criticized the more bellicose approach of the LDP to territorial issues and beefing up the military and is taking a more moderate stand.

Thus far, the center-right-leaning LDP has been much more openly supportive of nuclear power than many other parties, and it is less enthusiastic about the TPP given its close connection with rural voters and farmers. The LDP promotes a strong national defense approach, and Abe (who is more conservative than many in his party) has even talked about stationing Japanese officials or self-defense forces on the Senkaku Islands as a way to demonstrate control, which would undoubtedly create more problems with China and for the Japanese economy. On the economy, the LDP is pushing for a fiscal stimulus, particularly public works programs outside of the cities, and easing the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy. Abe is also urging education reform. Both the LDP and DPJ support the consumption tax hike.

The Restoration Party is, generally speaking, on the right. Before Ishihara joined Restoration, Hashimoto took an anti-nuclear stance. He also pushed for more decentralization and called for greater participation in regional trade agreements. But that anti-nuclear position has now been watered down and the party is taking a stronger stance on defense and more defiant approach on foreign policy in line with Ishihara’s views. Restoration supports the consumption tax hike, but wants it converted to something that fills local coffers instead of funneling it all through Tokyo.

The Future Party is the most purely liberal party and the most cohesive option on the left. It wants to quickly phase out the use of nuclear power and is also promoting social reform issues that emphasize the importance of women in the economy, something Kada is well known for advocating.

What will be the main issues during the campaign?

It’s difficult to tell what the voters care most about at this point.

Most analysts feel that at the end of the day, it’s the economy. Voters care about employment and enabling Japan’s economic growth. But many people are wary about returning to Japan’s old fiscal stimulus approach as it could reduce the value of the yen and their savings. This policy has saddled the country with the largest public deficit (as a percentage of GDP) of all the major developed countries—the government spends one out of every four yen servicing the debt.

The problem with the economic issue is there are so few good options at this stage. In many respects, the DPJ has some of the most sensible economic policies, but the party has alienated the electorate with its inability to effect positive change.

The economic arguments are probably the most important, but it’s difficult to see one party getting a massive influx of votes due to its economic policies. Even the previously high-profile issue of possibly joining TPP negotiations has waned somewhat, and few candidates are pushing free trade aggressively. So other issues are being highlighted to attract blocs of undecided voters.

There is a chance that the election will turn into a referendum on the future of nuclear power. Nuclear energy is an emotional issue given the Fukushima disaster, but there are also plenty of people worried about the economic ramifications of moving away from nuclear power. Turning to other sources of energy will create higher costs for businesses and put Japan at a competitive disadvantage.

And finally, there are the issues of regional relations and Japan’s foreign policy. The nationalist and defense argument—notably standing up to China—plays well with some. But there are just as many people worried that this will complicate economic ties, and they want leaders to take a less provocative stance.

Most analysts don’t think the historical and nationalistic issues are of primary concern to the broader public—it’s mostly an elite conservative clique that keeps this high on the agenda—but candidates often express the issues in populist terms and voters are certainly worried about China.

At this point, we are all waiting to see what the voter turnout will be and if any issue will compel people to go to the polls and tip the balance in a party’s favor. Turnout in 2009 was almost 70 percent, but it could be significantly lower this time.

What is the likely result?

The outcome is hard to predict. The LDP will win the most votes, but it’s possible that no single party will win a ruling majority on its own. So then the parlor game will begin over the formation of a governing coalition. Even if the LDP gains a majority, it will need help from other parties to overcome obstruction tactics by the opposition.

Much will depend on how the two new parties—Restoration and Future—perform. So called third-party candidates will run against one another in about 30 percent of the districts, so they could end up splitting the anti-establishment vote.

The most stable arrangement would be a marriage between the LDP, New Komeito, and the DPJ. Notwithstanding their different stances on nuclear energy and economic stimulus policies, the LDP and DPJ have cooperated on legislation in the past, and the DPJ has a large number of seats in the upper house that can facilitate lawmaking. The DPJ has jettisoned some of its most liberal elements of the party, which should make a stable coalition feasible.

The problem is that the DPJ and LDP are the two main players in the election, so they are obligated to go toe to toe in the lead-up to the vote and highlight their differences. The electoral friction (and some personal friction between Abe and Noda) could make this arrangement too difficult. If the LDP needs another partner, it might want to partner with a less experienced and less formidable party that it can push around a bit more. So, a distinct option is a coalition with the Restoration Party.

After six prime ministers in six years, the electorate is fed up with politicians who are unable to manage the government smoothly and effect positive change in their lives. And that makes the results difficult to forecast.

What is the significance of the election?

Japan needs a more effective and efficient government. But political fragmentation has stifled progress in recent years. These are not big ideological battles—these are often disagreements between personalities and parties.

Many people hoped that the LDP and DPJ would develop into distinct center-right and center-left choices. This, however, has not happened, leading some to wonder whether Japan would be better off with more of a one-party ruling system in which one big-tent party can simply hash things out internally (the way the LDP used to do). Of course, this is not an ideal form of democracy.

The hope is that this election can help build a stable model of governance for Japan in the twenty-first century. Skepticism runs high right now as the campaign is not shaping up to deliver a strong government. But I’m cautiously hopeful that a solid-enough coalition will be formed after the election and Japan can move forward.

There will an upper house election in July 2013, so this is going to happen all over again in seven months. It’s an important opportunity for Japanese voters to lay the groundwork for a more stable and effective government in the future.

How will the result impact Tokyo’s foreign policy? How will the election impact Japan’s relations with the region?

This of course depends on the results of the election, but as long as the election does not focus too heavily on territorial disputes or the right-wing revisionist agenda, there is a real chance for better regional relations after the election.

Repairing bridges is important for Japan’s future. The country is currently in a recession that was caused in large part by the fall in Chinese demand for Japanese goods—after boycotts and anti-Japan demonstrations—and the dip in demand from Europe. Because of that, one way to jumpstart the economy is to improve relations with China (as long as China reciprocates diplomatic overtures from Tokyo). And this can be done without creating debt.

Even if Shinzo Abe emerges as the next prime minister and continues some of his tougher rhetoric, the relationship with China could improve. He will likely devote more money to the coast guard and military, but he is unlikely to position any people or structures on the disputed Senkaku Islands. And when Abe was first prime minister in 2006 he helped mend fences with China and South Korea after relations had soured under Junichiro Koizumi.

Now is a good time to improve regional relations. The leaders of Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States will all be newly installed, so there will be a unique opportunity to reduce tensions and increase cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Why is Japan’s political future important for the United States?

U.S.-Japan relations have remained solid in recent years, but political weakness in Tokyo since 2006 has left the allies treading water to some extent on a number of initiatives. The two countries share many common values and interests, so Japan can be an invaluable partner for the United States as it rebalances its investments toward Asia.

Japan still matters, and it will be a major player in shaping Asia’s future. Despite unfulfilled expectations, the security aspects of the bilateral relations have been strengthened in recent years and there is a roadmap for relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to a less-populated area in Okinawa.

Still, all progress has been on the margins, and it didn’t require major expenditure of political capital in Tokyo. This will soon change. Decisions that could affect the implementation of relocation plans are right around the corner. Japan will need to submit a landfill permit application for the new military base in Okinawa before the relocation can proceed. So any new government will have to deal with this. And Japan needs to decide if it wants to join TPP negotiations or proceed with other free trade initiatives.

Again, if Japan is going to be heard on the international stage, it needs a stable governing structure. And Washington needs a strong partner in Tokyo.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.