Commentary
The full list of humiliations Europe has endured since Donald Trump returned to the White House makes for grim reading. But Washington’s adversarial approach to its allies undermines its own power base.
Rym Momtaz
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Source: Getty
In The Media
China’s Diplomatic Duo Fails to Engineer a Successful Summit with Europe
The meeting—although depicted as a decisive diplomatic victory by Chinese state media—was especially disappointing to Chinese leadership considering they were trying to accomplish larger geostrategic goals. One was to prevent the creation of a united transatlantic front against China.
Published on Sep 21, 2020
Source: National Interest
While China had declared 2020 a critical year for relations with Europe, the EU-China virtual summit which took place on September 14 between Chinese president Xi Jinping and EU leaders German Chancellor Angela Merkel, European Council head Charles Michel, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen fell short of expectations. Some Europeans were optimistically hoping to conclude the negotiations on the long-awaited Common Agreement on Investment, which have now dragged into their seventh year. Others in Brussels were relieved that the summit didn’t take place in Leipzig in the presence of the twenty-eight leaders (twenty-seven EU countries and China) as was originally planned by Germany, the holder of the six-month rotating presidency. In the end, despite statements about what has been achieved in the meeting by European leaders—addressing Chinese state aid and addressing technology transfers from Europe to China—the actual outcome had little substance. In particular, China did not agree on economic reciprocity—the primary demand from the European side.
The meeting—although depicted as a decisive diplomatic victory by Chinese state media—was especially disappointing to Chinese leadership considering they were trying to accomplish larger geostrategic goals. One was to prevent the creation of a united transatlantic front against China, spurred on by recent visits to Western and Central Europe by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien. Rejecting any kind of strategic alignment either in the direction of the United States or China, President Charles Michel told reporters afterward “Europe is a player, not a playing field.” The second broad Chinese goal was to reassure Europeans after souring relations this year after coronavirus. Still reeling from the pandemic, the accompanying economic recession, and now—what many perceive to be an opportunistic expansion of Chinese aggression—Europe has recently channeled pain and anger into pushback on contentious foreign policy issues against China, mainly on Huawei (5G) and Hong Kong, but also on the treatment by the PRC of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang.
This article was originally published by the National Interest.
About the Authors
Philippe Le Corre
Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Program
Philippe Le Corre was a nonresident senior fellow in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
John Ferguson
John Ferguson is a research assistant at the Harvard Kennedy School’s M-RCBG.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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