Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld completed a shortened series of talks with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov on August 11 and found himself and the United States no closer to convincing Russia of the need to abandon the ABM Treaty than when he arrived. Even a meeting with President Putin produced no direct progress on the issue of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which Russia continues to view as a lynchpin for the security of their strategic nuclear deterrent.
It should come as no surprise that the two sides failed to come to any major agreement during Secretary Rumsfeld’s visit. On the two issues the United States is trying to address -- deployment of missile defenses and reductions in nuclear weapons -- the Bush administration has not yet decided what it would like to accomplish. Other than declaring its desire to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the administration has yet to decide on what types of missile defenses it might like to deploy, or how capable those systems should be (in terms of how many missile it might be able to intercept). In addition, the administration has been unable to convince the Pentagon’s top brass to accept a level of nuclear forces below the 2,500 per side figure agreed to by President’s Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997. It would be politically difficult for the administration to come out with a number that high, given their stated desire to pursue deep cuts in offensive forces and Russia’s stated to desire to cut to at least 1,500 weapons.
The intensive talks between U.S. and Russia officials are expected to continue in the coming week and months, leading up to the scheduled summit between Presidents Bush and Putin in Texas in November. The Defense Department hopes to have completed its ongoing review of the U.S. nuclear posture by then to produce a new target for nuclear reductions.