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A Deeply Flawed India Deal

In a February 14 letter to Congress, six nonproliferation experts and former government officials detailed the serious problems with the proposed US-India nuclear deal. Their core concern is thatU.S.trade and cooperation would directly assistIndia’s nuclear weapons program. This would violate existingU.S.laws and theU.S.commitment in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 

The experts say, “Building upon the already strong U.S.-Indian partnership is an important goal, and we remain convinced that it can be achieved without underminingU.S.leadership efforts to prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

 

They caution, however, that “on balance,India’s commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions toU.S.law and international nonproliferation norms. At a minimum, this requires permanent, facility-specific safeguards on a mutually agreed and broad list of current and future civil Indian nuclear facilities and material, as well a cutoff of Indian fissile material production for weapons.”

For a pdf of the seven-page letter, click here.


Published on February 28, 2006

In a February 14 letter to Congress, six nonproliferation experts and former government officials detailed the serious problems with the proposed US-India nuclear deal. Their core concern is that U.S. trade and cooperation would directly assist India’s nuclear weapons program. This would violate existing U.S. laws and the U.S. commitment in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 

The experts say, “Building upon the already strong U.S.-Indian partnership is an important goal, and we remain convinced that it can be achieved without undermining U.S. leadership efforts to prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

 

They caution, however, that “on balance, India’s commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to U.S. law and international nonproliferation norms. At a minimum, this requires permanent, facility-specific safeguards on a mutually agreed and broad list of current and future civil Indian nuclear facilities and material, as well a cutoff of Indian fissile material production for weapons.”

For a pdf of the seven-page letter, click here.

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